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1. Introduction
Forecasts of GDP growth, inflation and other macroeconomic variables play an important
role in the economy because they influence the investment and production decisions of firms and
policy actions of central banks and other policy-makers. The success of firms and the ability of
policy-makers to promote economic stability and long-term growth are determined by their
access to accurate macroforecasts.
Unfortunately, studies have consistently found that economists do a poor job forecasting
macroeconomic variables (Zarnowitz, 1984; Zarnowitz, 1992; Zarnowitz & Braun, 1993; Schuh,
2001; Bauer, Eisenbeis, Waggoner & Zha, 2003). This is especially true around business cycle
turning points and other periods of significant economic change. For example, Schuh (2001) has
shown that all participants in the Survey of Professional Forecasts persistently under-predicted
GDP growth in the United States four years in a row between 1996 and 1999. Similarly, all
members of the Blue Chip panel of macroforecasters over predicted economic growth during the
Great Recession.
While the performance of individual forecasters has been poor, it has been shown in a
number of studies that there is a “wisdom of the crowd” in this field. That is, the mean forecast
across all forecasters, referred to as the “consensus forecast,” is more accurate than most
individual forecasts (Zarnowitz, 1984; Zarnowitz, 1992; Zarnowitz & Braun, 1993; Bauer,
Eisenbeis, Waggoner & Zha, 2003). For example, Bauer et al. (2003) find:
The Blue Chip Consensus Forecast consistently performs better than any of the individual
forecasters do. This result is a ‘reverse Lake Wobegon’ effect: none of the forecasters are
better than the average forecaster…There are superior forecasters, but no individual has
access to all of the independent information from all of the forecasts that is incorporated
into the consensus forecast. (p. 27)

Freedman
Other researchers theorize that the consensus forecast has superior accuracy due to the diversity
of individual estimation procedures and information used by macroforecasters to predict
macroeconomic variables (Page, 2004; Bates & Granger, 1969).
One explanation for the poor performance of individual macroeconomic forecasters is
that it is extremely difficult to produce accurate forecasts given the complexity of the
macroeconomic system and the inherent difficulty of predicting “shocks” which, by their very
nature, are unpredictable. An alternative explanation is that forecasters do not operate in a
vacuum and that interaction between them and additional motivations – beyond simple
maximization of accuracy – contribute to their poor track record. For instance, Lamont (2002)
argues that the presence of principal-agent problems can cause forecasters to use their forecasts
to manipulate beliefs about their ability. According to this view, forecasters sell their services
(forecasts) in monopolistically competitive markets where there is relatively free entry and exit
and potential for product differentiation. Moreover, the consumers in these markets (firms and
governments purchasing the forecasts, the “principals”) have imperfect information about the
quality of the forecasts (the “agents”). Given this market structure, it may be in the forecasters’
best interests to deliberately deviate from other forecasters to garner positive publicity for their
product. Alternatively, forecasters may mimic the forecasts of others (herd to the pack) in an
attempt to build a reputation as a consistently accurate forecaster among competitors (Laster,
Bennett & Geoum, 1999).
Previous studies have examined cross-sectional variation in herding and deviating
behavior. For instance Laster et al. (1999) show that independent forecasters deviate more from
other forecasters than non-independent forecasters (e.g., those affiliated with banks, industrial
firms, etc.) and conclude that the independent forecasters herd less because they place a greater
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value on publicity. Lamont (2002) provides evidence that more experienced forecasters herd less
than inexperienced ones and argues that this phenomenon illustrates forecasters’ recognition of
their true ability as they gain more experience. Gallo, Granger and Jeon (2002) find that
forecasters place a significant weight on the previous period consensus forecast when updating
their individual forecast.
In contrast to previous studies which focus on cross-sectional variation in forecasters’
propensity to herd, this thesis examines variations in herding behavior over time. I provide two
unique theories of herding behavior over time and test each. The first, which I refer to as the
Mud on Your Face Theory, contends that forecasters choose their herding behavior based on
their recent individual performance. Using Kahneman and Tversky’s Prospect Theory (1979;
1992), the theory predicts that forecasters herd less following large personal forecast errors
because they have suffered a loss to their reputation, become risk seeking and choose the riskier
strategy of deviating from other forecasters. Conversely, after forecasters forecast accurately,
they achieve reputational gains and become risk averse, and consequently decide to herd more.
Alternatively, the second theory, which I refer to as the Transitory Wisdom of Crowds,
suggests that herding behavior is driven by the recent performance of the consensus forecast.
This theory predicts that forecasters are more likely to herd to the consensus forecast if the
consensus has been accurate, and deviate from the consensus if it has been inaccurate.
I first address the previous macroforecasting and herding literature. I then provide two
theories that may explain changes in aggregate herding behavior over time. Next, I summarize
the data I use to evaluate these theories. Then I present the empirical model I use to measure
aggregate herding behavior and test my two theoretical models. I conclude by analyzing the
empirical results.
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2. Previous Literature
2.1. Macroforecasting
Macroforecasters aim to accurately predict macroeconomic variables such as GDP
growth, unemployment rates and interest rates. This information is used across many industries
to make business decisions regarding output, employment and investment as well as to guide
government policy.
Initially, researchers who studied the forecasting industry assumed that macroforecasters’
incentive structures only rewarded forecasting accuracy. That is, that they simply attempted to
minimize their mean forecast error. However, in the 1990s, researchers began to recognize other
factors that influence forecasts, collectively named “rational bias.” For example, researchers
have found that forecasters attempted to generate publicity for their firm to gain new clients by
differentiating their forecast from others (Batchelor & Dua, 1990; Lamont, 2002).
The wide demand for macroforecasting services has spurred the creation of numerous
forecasting firms. These forecasters are either directly employed by the consumer of their
forecasts (e.g., firms that forecast exclusively for specific banks, industrial organizations or
governments) or they are employed by a variety of consumers (e.g. independent forecasting
firms). The forecasting methods of these firms vary considerably, with some using formal
econometric models and others using less formal subjective methods. As an added performance
incentive, several publications that report survey panels of forecasts also provide a winner-takeall award to the most accurate forecaster.1
Individually, macroforecasters have struggled to accurately predict macroeconomic
indicators. Although they are able to perform with relatively high success during periods of
1

These awards are generally given to a forecaster who is consistently accurate. For example, the Lawrence R. Klein
award is given to the forecaster that has the smallest errors when forecasting real GDP growth, CPI inflation, the
unemployment rate and the three-month Treasury bill rate from the Blue Chip Economic Indicators over a four-year
period.
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consistent, predictable growth, they often struggle to identify turning points, such as transitions
from expansions to recessions (peaks) and vice versa (troughs).
2.2 The Benefits of Herding to Other Forecasters
A large portion of the macroforecasting literature has addressed herding, in which
forecasters choose to incorporate the previous forecasts of other forecasters into their updated
forecasts rather than relying exclusively on their private information. There are several benefits
of herding to other forecasters. Two benefits have been discussed at length in the literature:
taking advantage of the hard-won information of others (information-based herding) and
avoiding reputational losses due to deviating from the forecasts of others while incurring large
errors (reputation-based herding).
Information-based herding occurs when decision makers herd to take advantage of
others’ information (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer & Welch, 1992; 1998). In Bikchandani et al.’s
theoretical model, they assume a set of sequential decision-makers that make binary affirmative
or negative decisions. These individuals make their respective decisions one after the other,
basing their choices on their private signals as well as the decisions of the previous individuals.
However, the decision-makers can only see the actions of the individuals before them
(observable actions) but cannot see their signals (unobservable signals). Additionally, none of
the individuals know the precision of their private signal or the precision of the private signals of
others.
The first mover only acts based on the information in his private signal because he does
not know the precision of his private signal. Depending on his unobservable signal, the second
mover then has the choice to either follow or deviate from the first mover. Specifically, if the
first mover’s observable action aligned with the second mover’s unobservable signal, the second
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mover would always choose the same decision as the first mover. If the first mover’s observable
action differed from the second mover’s unobservable signal, however, the second mover would
be indifferent between following the first mover or following his private signal. Based on their
model, Bikhchandani et al. contend that the third individual would likely follow the first two
actors if they chose the same option regardless of his private signal. If the first two actors chose
different options, however, he would be in the same position as the first mover and would move
based on his private signal. The authors define the case in which one individual and all
subsequent individuals follow the observable actions of the previous actors and ignore their
private signals as an “informational cascade.” Once the cascade begins and individuals stop
acting based on their private signals, the aggregation of private information in the decisions
stops. If they follow the correct signal and all subsequent actors make the right choice, it is
deemed a positive cascade; if not, it is a negative cascade.
Although their theory does not directly relate to forecasting, Bikhchandani et al. (1998)
tie the model into the general case of observing the summary statistic of individuals who have
already acted, similar to macroforecasting. They theorize that as long as the perceived precision
of the previous signals exceeds the decision-maker’s perception of the precision of his private
signal, the decision-maker will herd to the behavior of individuals before him. This situation
strongly resembles the case of macroforecasting, in which macroforecasters have the ability to
judge the recent success of their peers by comparing their peers’ recent forecasts to the actual
values of the variable being forecasted. However, Bikhchandani et al.’s model deviates from the
case of macroforecasting. Most notably, their model only allows for actors to make a binary
decision of herding or non-herding on a binary task. In macroforecasting, forecasters have the
option to choose the degree to which they herd, if at all.
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An alternative form of herding, reputation-based herding, occurs when individuals herd
to avoid falling far outside the group, rather than herding to take advantage of others’
information (Bikhchandani et al., 1998; Scharfstein & Stein, 1990). Bikhchandani et al.’s (1998)
theory is similar to that in Asch’s (1952) experiment, in which individuals knowingly answered a
question incorrectly for the sake of avoiding stigma due to deviating from the responses of
confederates in the experiment.2 In the terms of their informational cascade framework,
Bikhchandani et al. (1998) claim that individuals that act to avoid stigmatization are likely to
continue a negative cascade, even if their private signal precisely indicates otherwise.
Scharfstein and Stein (1990) add reputational considerations to the implied objective
function of decision-makers in Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch’s (1998) model. In
Scharfstein and Stein’s principal-agent model, investors are either “smart” due to their highly
informative signals that are highly correlated with market outcomes, or they are “dumb” and
receive uninformative, noisy signals. Scharfstein and Stein propose a “bright minds think alike”
assumption, suggesting that the “smart” forecasters will forecast in a tight pack around their
highly informative signals, and “dumb” forecasters will be randomly dispersed around the pack
of “smart” forecasters. Consequently, because neither the investors nor their clients know their
true ability and signal precision, the market’s perception of an investor’s ability is based on the
degree of similarity between an investor’s choices and other investors’ decisions.
In a framework of sequential decision-making similar to Bikhchandani et al. (1998),
Scharfstein and Stein (1990) argue that individuals are very likely to mimic the decisions of

2

Asch (1952) studied group conformity. In his experiment, subjects entered a room full of confederates, whom they
were told were other participants. Each of the confederates and the subject were asked to identify the relative
lengths of lines presented by the experimenter. Prior to the subject providing his or her opinion, all of the
confederates misidentified the relative lengths of the lines. When it was the subject’s turn, they frequently gave the
same erroneous response as the confederates. Asch attributed this result to the subject’s need to conform to the
group; although he knew the correct answer, he gave an incorrect answer to be similar to the other group members.
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other investors for fear of exposing themselves as incompetent by predicting values that are far
from the group average. This type of reputation-based herding is also applicable to
macroforecasting, in which forecasters potentially have a high propensity to herd to the
consensus forecast in order to guarantee that, even if they are incorrect, they are wrong with the
other members of the group rather than being wrong alone.
Lamont (2002) empirically tested Scharfstein and Stein’s (1990) theory of reputationbased herding among macroforecasters. Lamont examines two components that influence
herding behavior over macroforecasters’ life cycles. First, Lamont proposes the “tight-priors”
effect, which postulates that as a forecaster’s experience increases, that forecaster’s ability
becomes apparent and he is not able to deceive clients of his ability by following the herd.
Consequently, the theory predicts that forecasters herd less over their life cycles. Lamont also
considers the “far-to-fall” effect, in which a forecaster’s incentive to herd rises over his life cycle
due to the greater potential losses from deviating from the crowd later in the forecaster’s career
after he has achieved a strong reputation. Using annual macroforecasting data from Business
Week, Lamont finds that forecasters’ deviations from the consensus increase over their life cycle,
providing support for the tight-priors effect over the far-to-fall effect.3
Additional research has addressed other cross-sectional characteristics of
macroforecasters’ herding behavior. Ferderer, Pandey and Velatsianos (2005) built upon
Lamont’s (2002) work by comparing empirical evidence for information-based and reputationbased herding among macroforecasters using macroforecast data from the Blue Chip Economic
Indicators data for real gross domestic product (GNP) growth, CPI inflation, the unemployment
3

Lamont (2002) provided additional support for this finding based on the comparative performance of human
forecasters compared to econometric modelers. Specifically, he hypothesized that the theories would only apply to
human forecasters whose forecasts are affected by reputational concerns, and that econometric modelers’ forecasts
would not follow the same patterns due to their objective forecasting methods. As expected, he finds that the tightpriors effect holds only for human forecasters, and not econometric modelers.
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rate and short-term interest rates. After dividing the forecasters into winners and non-winners of
the Lawrence R. Klein Blue Chip Forecasting award, Ferderer et al. (2005) found support for
information-based herding. Specifically, they find that forecasters who win the award are
generally less likely to herd, showcasing the perceived strength of their private signal. When
they do herd, they are much more successful at efficiently incorporating information only from
other winners. Alternatively, they find that non-winners herd more over their life cycles as they
recognize the additional signal accuracy included in others’ forecasts compared to their private
signals. These non-winners are also less efficient when herding and herd to a larger group of less
accurate forecasters than to the forecasts of winners.
2.3 The Benefits of Deviating from Other Forecasters
Forecasters also benefit from deviating from the predictions of other forecasters.
Consider the market structure of forecasters as monopolistically competitive: the services
provided by forecasters are highly differentiated, there is free exit and entry into the market,
there are many consumers and forecasters in the market, and forecasters have some control over
the price of their services. Consequently, forecasters are incentivized to differentiate their
product by offering the lone best product to maximize the price they can charge for their
services. Batchelor and Dua (1990) conducted one of the seminal studies on forecast
differentiation and found that a select group of forecasters consistently provided overly
optimistic or pessimistic forecasts over the sample period and concluded that this strategy of
providing extreme forecasts was used to differentiate their product. Subsequent research has
evaluated how forecasters’ decisions to herd and deviate from other forecasters vary across
different types of forecasters based on the incentive structure that comprises each forecaster’s
unique reward function (Laster et al., 1999).
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Macroforecasters are incentivized to both maximize their individual accuracy and
generate positive publicity for their firm (Batchelor & Dua, 1990; Hong, Page & Riolo, 2011;
Laster et al., 1999).4 In most cases, forecasters are influenced by both incentives and choose
their herding behavior as a combination of the two, based on the preferences of their clients.
“Profit maximisation by forecasters may involve sacrificing some accuracy in the interests of
producing a distinctive product. So it may be optimal for forecasters to publish technically
irrational forecasts in a commercial forecasting environment” (Batchelor and Dua, 1990).
In the first incentive structure, forecasters are compensated based only on their individual
accuracy of predicting an economic indicator. If they predict correctly, regardless of how the
other forecasters perform, they will receive a high payoff. This compensation framework is
likely to dominate among institutional forecasters, such as banks or manufacturing firms, in
which the forecasters already have their clients and are forecasting for internal purposes.
In contrast, forecasters are also rewarded based on their performance relative to the rest
of the group and the consequent publicity they generate for their firm. If they predict correctly,
their compensation is inversely related to the number of other forecasters who also predict
correctly (i.e. compensation is highest when a forecaster is correct alone and lower when he and
many other forecasters are all correct). Consequently, this incentive structure rewards
forecasters for deviating from the group and can cause them to forgo potential accuracy for the
potential positive publicity achieved by being correct and different from all other forecasters.
This compensation framework is more likely to dominate the objective functions of aspiring
forecasters who are looking for new clients and therefore are trying to differentiate themselves

4

Hong et al. (2011) refer to the incentive structure that rewards individual accuracy as “individual-based incentives”
and the incentive structure that rewards generating publicity for one’s firm as “market-based incentives”. I exclude
this terminology to simplify my analysis of these incentive structures.
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from the herd by generating publicity for their services (Batchelor & Dua, 1990; Hong et al.,
2011; Laster, Bennett and Geoum, 1999).
It is important to note that an individual forecaster’s utility function generally includes
incentives that reward his individual accuracy, as well as incentives that reward him for
generating positive publicity for his firm, based on his personal preferences as well as the
preferences of his clients. Consequently, forecasters attempt to maximize their utility (wages)
subject to the constraints of their market structure. Laster et al. (1999) studied systematic
differences between the market structures of different types of forecasters that arise from the
demands of their clients.
Laster et al. empirically examined the relative importance of accuracy-driven and
publicity-driven incentives for different types of forecasters. Specifically, Laster et al. employ a
framework in which a forecaster’s wage is determined by his accuracy and by the publicity he
generates for his firm by differentiating his product from his competitors. In Laster et al.’s
model, the users of forecasts are divided into two groups: “intensive” users that consistently
follow forecasts to guide business decisions, and “occasional” users that only use forecasts
periodically. Laster et al. theorize that intensive users likely monitor a set group of forecasts
each period. Consequently, forecasters that cater to these users are more incentivized to produce
consistently accurate forecasts than to generate publicity for their product. Alternatively,
occasional users tend to choose a forecaster based on his recent performance. Consequently,
forecasters that cater to occasional users are incentivized to deviate from other forecasters to
differentiate their product while also attempting to maximize accuracy, but to a lesser degree
than forecasters that already serve intensive users.
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In their paper, Laster et al. (1999) analyze the cross sectional differences in herding
behavior of different types of forecasters. One group, which consists of banks, econometric
modelers, industrial firms and security firms, caters to “intensive users” of forecasts.
Alternatively, independent forecasters target “occasional users” of forecasts. Therefore, the
utility function of the first group, which caters to intensive users, consists of a compensation
structure that rewards these forecasters for their consistent individual accuracy more than
generating publicity for their firm, as their customers are more interested in their consistent
success than occasionally being the most accurate forecaster. In contrast, the second group,
which consists of independent forecasters, is rewarded more for generating publicity for their
firm than being consistently accurate. This strategy is used by independent forecasters to
differentiate themselves from their competitors to gain new “occasional” users. These
independent forecasters may gain publicity from time to time by choosing to deviate from the
consensus, and thus will be less accurate on average. However, independent forecasters are
willing to accept long-term inaccuracy to periodically gain occasional users. Laster et al.’s
(1999) results support their theory, indicating that independent forecasters deviate most from the
consensus forecast.
2.4 The Value of the Consensus Forecast
2.4.1 Accuracy of the Consensus
After extensive research into the performance of individual forecasters, studies shifted
their focus to the performance of the consensus forecast, a simple average of all the individual
forecasts. Researchers hypothesized that the consensus forecast would be more accurate than
individual forecasts because it aggregates the diverse estimation procedures of all the individuals
included in the consensus. Consequently, they predicted that individual forecasters’ estimation
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biases would cancel to reveal the true value of the indicator in the consensus. Studies using the
Blue Chip Economic Indicators consistently find evidence of the “wisdom of crowds” in
macroforecasting, in which the ‘crowd’ (the consensus forecast) consistently if not always
outperforms the best individual forecaster (Zarnowitz, 1984; Zarnowitz, 1992; Zarnowitz &
Braun, 1993; Bauer, Eisenbeis, Waggoner & Zha, 2003).5 Additionally, recent studies of
herding have found that when macroforecasters choose to herd, they generally herd to the
consensus forecast (Ferderer et al., 2005).
2.4.2 The Value of Diversity6
Researchers theorize that the consensus forecast outperforms individual forecasts due to
the cognitive (and consequently, model specification) diversity of forecasters. For instance, Page
(2007) shows that group success is based on two factors: individual ability and the components
of individual diversity (perspective, interpretation, heuristic and predictive model diversity). 7
Assuming that a sample is drawn from a large group of smart and diverse individuals that are
working on a difficult task, his theory predicts that a group of randomly selected decision-makers
will generally outperform a group of the best-performing individuals on problem-solving tasks.
Based on this theory, he argues that the diversity of a group drives the group’s performance as
much as their individual abilities.

5

For a review of the consensus forecasting literature, see Clemen (1989). It is important to note that, although
individual performance varies significantly from period to period, in the long run there are high-performance and
low-performance individual forecasters (Schuh, 2001).
6
Although the core of diversity literature presented in this paper is drawn from Page’s (2007) book, the importance
of diversity and the wisdom of crowds has been addressed widely the in statistics and economics literature. One of
the first studies was conducted by Galton (1907), in which he calculated the consensus estimate of the weight of a
steer at a county fair in England. More recently, Bates and Granger (1969) advocated for ideological diversity in
forecasts to maximize the collective value of a consensus forecast. For a complete review of the wisdom of crowds
literature, see Surowiecki (2004).
7
He claims that each individual has unique approaches to characterizing situations and challenges (perspective
diversity), organizing their perspectives (interpretation diversity), developing resolutions to problems (heuristic
diversity) and modeling cause and effect (predictive model diversity).
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Page and Hong (2004) empirically test this theory using computer-generated actors that
have constant perspectives but different individual abilities and problem-solving heuristics.
After testing each individual for baseline performance on a task in which the individuals were
programmed to find the maximum value of a random value function, they assembled teams of 10
and 20 from two pools: top-performers and randomly selected agents. These teams worked
together by using their heuristics to maximize a local value, such that after the previous actor
could not find a higher value, the next individual would take over. Eventually, when all the
agents became stuck on the same point, the exercise would stop. Page and Hong found that, on
the whole, teams of randomly selected actors had considerably more heuristic diversity than
teams of top performers and on average performed better than the teams of top performers.
One of the conclusions Page draws from this result is that the whole is greater than the
sum of its parts: collectively, a diverse group can do more than what all the individual group
members could do separately. For example, if one individual possesses one approach to a unique
problem and another person has a different approach, individually they may not be able to solve
a more complicated problem. However, if they work together and combine their problem
solving techniques (heuristics), they are more likely to be able to solve the problem. Page
explains this outcome using an analogy of a toolbox: although all the individual tools in a
toolbox may only be able to accomplish simple tasks such as hammering a nail or screwing a
screw, together, through their collective abilities, they are able to accomplish much greater tasks
such as building a tree house (Page, 2007).
Page applies these findings to the predictive ability of teams, and concludes that as a
crowd’s diversity increases, the error of the crowd’s consensus forecast decreases. He bases this
finding on what he terms the “Diversity Prediction Theorem”:

Freedman 16
!
!

!!!! (!!

!

− !!,! )! = !

!
!
!!![!

!
!!!

!

!!,! − !!,! )! − !

!
!
!!![!

!
!!!(!!,!

− !! )! ]

(1)

Collective Error = Average Individual Error – Prediction Diversity
!

The theorem states that the average consensus squared error (!

!
!!!( !!

− !! )! : average squared

deviations of the consensus forecast (!! )  from the actual (y!,! ) outcome for periods 1 through N)
!

equals the average individual squared error (!

!
!
!!![!

!
!!!

y!,! -‐y!,! )! : average squared

difference between forecaster i through !’s forecasts (!!,! ) and the actual forecasts (!!,! ) for
periods 1 through N) minus the prediction diversity (

!
!

!
!
!!![!

!
!!!(!!,!

− !! )! ]: average squared

differences between forecaster i through !’s forecasts (!!,! ) and the consensus forecasts (!! ) for
periods 1 through N). Using this theorem, he extends his previous conclusions to predictive
tasks, finding that diversity is of equal importance to individual ability. In these cases, he
highlights the “Projection Property”: when various people base their predictive models on
different variables and they have the same perception of the problem they are solving, the
correctness of their predictions will generally be negatively correlated, and they will cancel each
others’ errors. As diversity in the group grows, these benefits become multiplicative due to the
coverage of additional variables and the development of interactive effects in the consensus. In
terms of macroforecasting, Page’s framework explains the relative success of the consensus
forecast compared to all individual forecasters.
Herding presents a significant challenge to Page’s theory of the benefits of diversity.
Herding diminishes the cognitive diversity of a crowd because some proportion of the group
ignores their private information and their personal models of interpreting those signals. Page
(2007) recognizes the negative impact of herding on diversity, and consequently theorizes that to
maximize cognitive diversity, individuals should not be able to see others’ actions. This may not
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be possible in real-life environments in which forecasters have the ability to herd by
incorporating the consensus forecast from the previous period into their current-period forecast.
2.5 Addition to Literature
Previous studies of macroforecaster herding have focused on differences across
forecasters that affect their propensity to herd. The findings presented in this literature are very
important and necessary to control for when conducting empirical tests. However, in this study I
evaluate a group of forecasters’ average propensity to herd over time. I attempt to explain
systematic variations in forecasters’ herding behavior over time based on factors such as
business cycles and the accuracy of the consensus forecast.
3. Theory
As outlined above, macroeconomic forecasters are motivated by two primary
considerations: accuracy and publicity. Forecasters aim to be close to the actual value of the
variable they are predicting. However, their efforts to be accurate are mitigated by their desire to
receive publicity, which rewards them for being the lone correct forecaster. This motivates them
to differentiate their product from those of their competitors. Each month, forecasters learn the
predictions of other forecasters from the previous month through publications such as the Blue
Chip Macroeconomic Indicators. After receiving this information, forecasters then choose the
degree to which they incorporate the consensus forecast from the previous period into their
revised forecast based on their incentive structure and the public information available to them.
In this section I outline two theories that can explain fluctuations in macroforecasters’
herding behavior over time. The first, which I refer to as the Mud on Your Face theory, uses
Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; 1992) to predict how forecasters’ recent
individual accuracy influences their herding behavior. This theory predicts that, during periods
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in which forecasters are performing well (e.g., stable moderate expansionary stages of the
business cycle when there are few adverse shocks) and are experiencing reputational gains, they
will choose to herd more. However, during periods in which their individual accuracy decreases
(e.g., recessionary periods following a large negative shock or significant expansionary periods
following large positive shocks) and they are experiencing reputational losses, the theory
predicts that forecasters will choose to deviate more from the consensus. The key factor driving
this result is that forecasters’ risk preferences are determined by whether they are operating in
the domain of reputational gains or losses: during periods of reputational gains, forecasters are
risk averse which causes them to herd more. Alternatively, during periods of reputational losses,
forecasters are risk taking which causes them to herd less.
A second theory, The Theory of the Transitory Wisdom of Crowds, utilizes the recent
accuracy of the consensus forecast to predict macroforecasters’ herding decisions and is based on
information-based herding theory. The theory predicts that if the consensus forecast has been
accurate recently, forecasters will perceive that it contains valuable information and will choose
to herd more to increase the accuracy of their forecasts. Alternatively, if the consensus forecast
has been inaccurate, forecasters will choose not to decrease their herding behavior because they
perceive that the consensus does not contain valuable information.
3.1. Mud on Your Face Theory
One potential explanation of changes in herding behavior over time is how forecasters
respond to variations within the business cycle. Zarnowitz and Lambros (1987) find that the
variance of macroforecasts increases significantly following large negative or positive stochastic
shocks that force the macroeconomy into recession or rapid expansion, respectively. Zarnowitz
and Lambros theorize that this phenomenon occurs due to increased macroeconomic uncertainty
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during these periods. Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979; 1992) Prospect Theory provides a
potential alternative explanation for this outcome.
3.1.1. Prospect Theory
Kahneman and Tversky (1979; 1992) address agent decision-making under conditions of
uncertainty. They contest that actors begin at a reference point, having achieved either gains or
losses, which determines their current utility. Their future utility is determined by their relative
gains or losses to wealth or reputation from their current position.8 Kahneman and Tversky
derive this behavior from the incorporation of dynamic risk preferences into actors’ decisionmaking processes based on their changes to states of wealth (see Figure 1). They theorize that
when an individual’s reference point is positive and they have been achieving gains (on the
positive side of the x-axis; for example, Point A), they are risk averse due to the concavity of
their utility function. Due to the concavity of their utility function during these periods of gains,
Prospect Theory predicts that the disutility of a loss significantly exceeds the utility gains of a
comparable gain. Alternatively, when they are in the loss domain (on the negative side of the xaxis; for example, Point B), they are risk averse due to the convexity of their utility function.
Consequently, due to the convexity of their utility function during periods of losses, the utility of
a gain significantly exceeds the disutility of a comparable loss. 9
For example, consider a bettor’s betting behavior at the end of the day at the racetrack.
By the end of the day, most bettors are in the loss territory due to the racetrack’s advantage.
8

Alternatively, expected-utility theory predicts that individuals will rationally evaluate the probability of each
outcome and make a decision on how to act based on their expected outcome regardless of their reference point:
Expected Value = Prob (x1)*Expected Value (x1) + Prob (x2)*Expected Value (x2) … Prob (xn)*Expected Value
(xn). Expected-utility theory predicts that a decision maker’s final utility is determined by his final position on his
value function, as opposed to his change in position on the value function.
9
The other key finding of Prospect Theory is that individuals will overestimate the likelihood of unlikely outcomes
and underestimate the likelihood of likely outcomes. For example, for low likelihood events, individuals are keen
on making long shot bets and purchasing insurance, even though the possibility of winning the lottery or using the
insurance is very low. However, individuals generally overweight the difference in likelihoods for highly probable
versus certain events.
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Consequently, bettors attempt to return to gains territory by making bigger bets on long shot
horses, similar to publicity seeking forecasters driven by publicity-rewarding incentives.
Camerer (1998, pg. 7) contends, “These bettors really prefer longshots because a small longshot
bet can generate a large enough profit to cover their earlier losses, enabling them to break even.”
This result illustrates the dominance of prospect theory in human behavior, in that the bettor is
willing to forgo probable additional losses to generate the small possibility that his long shot bet
will result in a large payoff.
3.1.2. Application to Macroforecasters
Prior theoretical models of forecaster behavior assume risk neutrality (Scharfstein &
Stein, 1990; Laster, Bennett & Geoum, 1999). Consequently, to predict the implications of
Prospect Theory for macroforecaster herding, we must theorize the implications of dynamic risk
preferences on herding behavior.
Previous empirical studies find that forecasters consistently perform better during periods
of stable and predictable economic activity, in which large macroeconomic shocks do not occur
(Schuh, 2001; Zarnowitz, 1984; Zarnowitz, 1992; Zarnowitz & Braun, 1993). Lamont’s far-tofall effect may explain why forecasters herd more during these periods: “As a forecasters’ wages
and reputation rise over time, his reputation becomes a more valuable asset to be protected…and
herding increases” (1995). Although Lamont’s theory is designed to explain behavior over the
career of a macroeconomic forecaster, it provides useful insight into the short-run decisions of
individual macroforecasters as their reputation varies over the business cycle. During periods of
reputational gains, forecasters are likely risk averse and herd to avoid reputational losses from
inaccurate forecasts. Because their reputation is already high and the utility over gains is
concave, the additional utility generated from an even better reputation is small. If they herd and
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predict incorrectly, they will not be incorrect alone and suffer from a significant loss of
reputation. Prospect Theory’s predicted risk aversion strengthens Lamont’s far-to-fall effect,
which is hypothesized under risk neutrality.10
For example, consider Figure 2. This provides an example of a forecaster’s position on
his value function (y-axis) after a period of sustained, steady, low-shock growth, in which he is
in gains territory at point X (x-axis). He faces a decision, to herd more or less. If he herds more,
he reduces his range of possible reputational levels for the next period. On the one hand,
increased herding reduces his potential to stand out and experience a large gain in reputation. On
the other hand, increased herding protects him from a large drop in reputation by being wrong
alone. I assume that by herding, he has a .5 probability of either experiencing small gains or
small losses from either becoming more or less accurate (range A-A’), yielding an expected
value slightly below his current value (Expected Value Herding). If he herds less, however, he
faces a wider range of potential outcomes (assuming .5 probability of gains or losses, range BB’), yielding an expected value further below his current value, and below his expected value if
they were to herd (Expected Value Deviation). Due to the dynamic nature of his risk
preferences, his perceived potential losses are significantly greater than his perceived potential
gains of deviating from the consensus forecast, which results in herding behavior.
Alternatively, during periods following large unpredictable macroeconomic shocks,
forecasters will perform worse and face reputational losses. Here, herding protects him against
further losses in reputation but his potential changes in utility are small. On the other hand, by
herding less the forecaster increases the possibility of receiving positive publicity, which
10

Lamont also addresses a competing theory, called the “tight priors effect,” in which a forecaster’s ability to herd
decreases throughout their career decreases as their clients become more aware of their actual ability. Similarly to
the far-to-fall effect, the tight priors effect is based on the progression of a forecaster’s herding behavior over the
career. However, there it is not applicable to the current case because I do not address the perception of a
forecaster’s ability over his career.
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increases his reputation and, due to the convexity of his utility function, provides him with large
positive marginal utility. For example, consider Figure 3. After a large macroeconomic shock, a
forecaster is in loss territory at point X (x-axis). Similar to the forecaster in gains territory in the
previous example, he also can choose to either herd or deviate from the lagged consensus. If he
herds, he can reduce the uncertainty of his utility in the next period by likely remaining near his
current position, assuming a .5 probability of experiencing small gains or small losses (range AA’). This option yields an expected value slightly above his current value (Expected Value
Herding). If he deviates from the lagged consensus, however, his expected value (Expected
Value Deviation) is significantly higher than both his current value and his expected value if he
were to herd. This is due to the wider range of potential outcomes and the convexity of his
utility function (assuming .5 probability of gains or losses, range B-B’). In this case, the
forecaster faces disincentives to herd because the perceived potential gains of deviating from the
consensus forecast outweigh the potential losses in the individual forecaster’s value function.
The Mud on Your Face Theory predicts that when a forecaster is performing well and
experiencing reputational gains, he will herd more. However, following poor performance and
consequent reputational losses, he will herd less. The two key assumptions that generate this
prediction are that (1) increased herding reduces the range of possible changes to reputation and
(2) there is a concave relationship between utility and reputation in the domain of gains and a
convex one in the domain of losses.
3.2. The Transitory Wisdom of Crowds
An alternative theory of macroforecaster herding behavior contends that macroforecasters
choose their herding behavior based on the accuracy of the consensus forecast over the past
several periods. For example, consider a multi-period model (shown in Figures 4a and 4b). In
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t = 0, individuals are in information isolation and are unable to herd to the consensus. In terms
of macroforecasters, this isolation occurs when they have no information about their peers’
forecasts, likely at the beginning of a new forecasting horizon. Consequently, they rely on their
private signals, which maximize the information diversity included in the consensus. Page
(2007) theorizes that this high level of diversity should maximize the accuracy of the consensus
forecast. In t =1, forecasters can observe the consensus forecast and recognize that it was more
accurate than their individual forecasts. Therefore, they choose to incorporate the lagged
consensus into their forecast revision to encompass the additional information included in it.
This diminishes the diversity and accuracy of the consensus forecast but increasing the accuracy
of their individual forecasts. In period t = 2, forecasters begin to recognize the diminishing
accuracy of the consensus and realize that their independent forecasts may be more accurate due
to the lack of diverse information contained in the consensus. Consequently, they diminish the
weight they place on the lagged consensus in their current period forecast. In period t = 3, as the
forecasters decrease the weight they place on the consensus, the diversity of information
included in and accuracy of the consensus begins to rise again, and once it exceeds the accuracy
of most forecasters, they will begin herding again, resulting in a cyclical pattern (See Figures 4a
and 4b). Due to the frequent updates published, the forecasters cannot sufficiently judge the
accuracy of the consensus from period to period. Consequently, herding behavior would
continue to fluctuate and not converge to an equilibrium value.
3.3. Summary of Theoretical Predictions
The Mud on Your Face theory and the Theory of the Transitory Wisdom of Crowds
provide identical hypotheses regarding herding behavior during periods in which recent
individual and consensus forecasts have been accurate or inaccurate. During periods in which
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the individual’s forecast and the consensus forecast have both been accurate, both models predict
that forecasters are motivated to engage in herding behavior and place a high weight on the
lagged consensus forecast when revising their forecast. Alternatively, during periods in which
both the individual’s forecast and the consensus forecast have been inaccurate, both theories
predict that the individual will deviate from the lagged consensus forecast.
However, during periods in which the accuracy of the individual’s forecast and the
consensus forecast have differed, the theories make different predictions. When the individual’s
forecast has been accurate and the consensus forecast has been inaccurate, the Mud on Your Face
theory predicts that the forecaster will herd more and the Transitory Wisdom of Crowds theory
predicts that the forecaster will deviate from the consensus. When the individual’s forecast has
been inaccurate and the consensus forecast has been accurate, the Mud on Your Face theory
predicts that the forecaster will herd less and the Transitory Wisdom of Crowds theory predicts
that the forecaster will herd more. These predictions are summarized in Table I.
4. Data / Summary Statistics
4.1 Conceptual Model
To evaluate the predicted theories, we aim to measure the components of the average
forecaster’s herding behavior. Herding in macroforecasting occurs when a forecaster is revising
his forecast and instead of only using his previous period forecast and new information about the
state of the macroeconomy, he also places some weight on the consensus forecast from the
previous period. In this thesis, I aim to estimate the average weight forecasters place on the
lagged consensus when making their current period forecast, what factors contribute to their
decision, and what other information they use when updating their forecast. The Mud on Your
Face theory suggests that the propensity to herd is inversely related to the forecaster’s recent
forecast error. The Theory of the Transitory Wisdom of Crowds proposes they choose based on
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the recent accuracy of the consensus forecast.11
4.2. Ideal Data
The ideal macroforecasting data for this analysis would cover a long period that includes
several business cycles. The data would include a balanced set of macroforecasters, all of who
would have forecasted in every period. Each of the forecasters would employ the same
forecasting staff across time to limit intra-forecaster firm heterogeneity. Additionally, the
distribution of forecasters within the sample would be constant across affiliations (e.g.
independent, industry, bank; see Laster et al., 1997).
Ideally, the data would also include information regarding what information each
forecaster includes in their model, why they choose their sources of information, and how they
choose the relative weight for each source of information. For example, if forecasters revealed
how confident they were in their previous period forecast, to what degree they decided to herd in
their current forecast and why they chose to herd, and other new information acquired during the
period they incorporated into their model, I would be able to make much more accurate and
precise evaluations of the theories.
4.3. Actual Data
Unfortunately, the data available are not ideal; however, they are sufficient for this
analysis. The forecasting data come from the Blue Chip Economic Indicators newsletter (Moore,
2008), which reports monthly forecasts for real gross national product (GNP) growth,
unemployment rate, inflation rate and other indicators. In this analysis, I evaluate the GNP and

11

Due to the use of panel data, this analysis includes data from many forecasters across time. This yields a
conceptual model in which the forecast of each forecaster at each point in time is based on the consensus forecast
from the previous period, interacted with the individual forecaster’s and consensus’ recent performance to measure
the relative importance of each component, as well as other information such as the forecaster’s previous period
forecast and additional news acquired over the period.
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unemployment rate forecasts. 12 These provide an interesting combination as GNP data is
released quarterly and revised for several years, whereas unemployment data is updated monthly
without revision. The forecasts are collected from forecasters during the first three days of each
month and reported later in the month in the newsletter. Each month, beginning in January,
forecasters are asked to predict the macroeconomic variables for the current year and next year.13
Each month the forecasters are asked to revise their forecasts from the previous month until their
final forecast for the current year and next year are made in December.
The dataset spans from January 1984 to December 200814 and includes forecasts from 120
forecasters.15 The number of forecasters varies across the sample (Mean monthly sample size =
51.1, Standard Deviation = 1.8). Several forecasters enter the publication only for a short period
or provide sporadic forecasts. To control for any potential bias that may arise from differentials
in experience or frequent exit and entry into the sample, I created a subsample of the original
dataset that only includes the 25 forecasters that forecasted at least 60% of the full sample period
(Mean = 22.8, Standard Deviation = 2.1).16 I refer to this subsample as the “veterans”.
Forecasters include econometric modelers, independent forecasters, and those employed by
banks, industrial corporations, securities firms and other agents.17 Due to the frequent entry and

12

In the data, the forecasters forecast GNP from 1984-1991, and real gross domestic product (GDP) from 19922008. Although the measure changes, I refer to the variable as “GNP” for simplicity’s sake.
13
In this analysis I only focus on current-year forecasts. It would be interesting to evaluate the next-year forecasts
to determine how the results change.
14
Due to the specification of the empirical model, specifically the need to include forecasters’ errors over the
previous year and forecasts from the previous month, the first year and first month of every year for every forecaster
are excluded from the statistical analysis, but are drawn upon when the model is evaluated. Consequently, the actual
number of forecasters included in the analysis is 113.
15
For additional information about the forecasters in the sample, please see Appendix I.
16
Figure 5 graphically depicts the number of forecasters in the “veterans” subsample and total sample. Previous
studies of herding behavior also focus on a similar subsample (Gallo et al., 2002). It is especially important to make
this distinction when using the Blue Chip dataset as forecasters must consistently forecast to be eligible for the
accuracy award. Consequently, forecasters that do not forecast consistently inherently have a different incentive
structure than those that forecast in every period.
17
These distinctions are based on the groupings made by Laster et al. (1999). “Other” agents include organizations
such as government agencies and insurance firms.
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exit of individual forecasters in the complete sample, the distribution of forecasters within these
categories changes substantially from period to period (see Table II).
The actual GNP and GDP data used to analyze individual and consensus accuracy was
collected from the first available estimates of the annual rates published in the “Economic Report
of the President” and the “Survey of Current Business.” These data sources are a theoretically
and empirically precise measure of evaluating how the forecasters evaluated their accuracy as
well as the accuracy of the consensus forecast, because the data used are “real-time,” meaning
they are the initial estimates of economic growth available to forecasters when making their
forecasts (Croushore & Stark, 2001).
The actual unemployment rate data were acquired from the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(2012). Real-time data were not acquired, as there are few revisions to unemployment reports.
Prior to using regression analysis to evaluate herding behavior, it is useful to examine the
fundamental characteristics of the data. First, consider Figures 6 and 7, which depict the
veterans and entire sample’s consensus forecast versus the actual values of GNP growth and
unemployment rates. After looking at Figure 6, it is easy to see that macroforecasters’ forecast
errors are larger during periods of recession and rapid expansion, such as the recession of the
early 1990s and early 2000s when forecasters under predicted the depth of the recession. These
results support the findings of previous empirical work (e.g. Zarnowitz, 1984, 1992; Schuh,
2001), which find that forecasters’ errors are lower during periods when GNP growth is near its
long-term trend rate (2-3%) versus high errors during periods of recession. It is also interesting
to note that in Figure 7 forecasters’ errors do not follow as significant a pattern for
unemployment forecasts. Rather, it appears that forecasts of unemployment face a short lag
behind the actual value of unemployment regardless of the point in the business cycle. It also
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appears that forecasters’ errors when forecasting GNP exceed their errors when forecasting
unemployment, especially around turning points. Also, Figures 6 and 7 confirm that the
forecasts of the entire sample of forecasters and the subsample of veterans were quite similar.
Figures 8-11 illustrate the dispersion of forecasts made in June and December versus the
actual rate of GNP growth. These figures provide a deeper exploration into forecasters’ errors
across the business cycle by showing the dispersion of forecasts instead of solely the consensus.
Figures 8 and 10 especially illustrate forecasters’ significant errors during recessionary and
especially large expansionary periods versus periods of relatively stable growth. For example,
consider years 1996 to 1999 in Figure 10. During this economic boom, forecasters’ June
forecasts were consistently below the actual economic growth rate. Also consider the recession
of 2008; Figure 10 clearly depicts forecasters’ overestimates of economic growth during this
recessionary period in which their optimism led to erroneous forecasts. Alternatively, consider
the beginning of the great moderation from approximately 1985 to 1991. During this period of
relatively stable and low economic growth, forecasters’ estimates of economic growth were
much closer to the actual outcomes.
Also, Figures 8-11 illustrate the clustering effect of forecasts throughout the year.
Specifically, by comparing the range of forecasts made in June versus December, it is easy to see
that the forecasts generally converge to one another later in the year. This clustering occurs due
to the incorporation of additional information throughout the year as forecasters gain more
insight into actual annual GNP growth.
5. Empirical Model
My empirical model aims to measure patterns in macroforecasters’ herding behavior
across time as a function of each forecaster’s individual accuracy (Mud on Your Face) and the
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accuracy of the consensus forecast (Transitory Wisdom of Crowds).18 Using a random effects
regression to analyze the unbalanced panel of macroeconomic forecasts, I test for the effects
predicted by the two theories across time while controlling for individual variation across
forecasters.19
5.1. Gallo et al. (2002) Model
The empirical model is adapted from Gallo et al. (2002), which was used to measure individual
forecasters’ propensity to herd:
!
!
!
!
y!,!
=  ∝    +!!! !!,!!!
+ !!! !!,!!! + !!! !!,!!!
+ !!,!

(2)

!
In their model, the dependent variable, !!,!
, represents forecaster i’s forecast that is j periods
!
from the target period in the current year t. The first term on the right side, y!,!!!
, represents

forecaster i's forecast in the previous period (one additional period from the target period: j+1).
!
The second term, y!,!!!
, represents the consensus forecast from the previous period.20 The third

term, σ!!,!!! , represents the group variance from the previous period.21
The first coefficient,  β!! , represents the weight that forecaster i places on their previous
period forecast when updating their current period forecast. The closer this value is to 1, the
more persistent the forecaster’s previous period forecast is in the current period forecast. The
second coefficient,  β!! , represents the weight forecaster i places on the lagged consensus forecast
when revising their current period forecast, thereby measuring a given forecaster’s propensity to

18

Herding behavior is also confirmed using tests of Granger Causality. For more information, please see Appendix
II.
19
Please see Appendix III for a rationale of the model estimation method.
! !!
20
The consensus forecast (the group’s average forecast) is functionally defined as: y!,! = !!!
!!! , where the
!
consensus forecast, ! at time t for N forecasters is equal to the summation of each forecaster i's forecast at time t,
divided by the number of forecasters at time t.
!
21
!
!
!
The group’s variance is functionally defined as: σ!!,! =
!!!(y! -‐y! ) .
!-‐!
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herd. Increases in !!! represent increases in forecasters’ propensity to herd. The final
coefficient,  !!! , measures how the dispersion of individual forecasts change as the forecasting
horizon decreases and approaches the target period. The classical error term, ε!!,! , accounts for
any other information forecasters include in their revised forecasts from sources other than the
lagged consensus or forecast dispersion. For example, if good news about the macroeconomy is
released during the forecasting period, the error term will be greater than zero indicating an
upward revision in forecasts not accounted for by the individual’s previous forecast or the
previous consensus forecast.
Gallo et al. (2002) evaluated herding behavior using an unbalanced panel of current-year
and future-year GNP growth forecasts from Consensus Forecasts. Their data included monthly
forecasts from 1993-1996 for U.S. GNP growth (17 forecasters, 1279 sample points), Japanese
GNP growth (10 companies, 752 sample points), and U.K. GNP growth (31 companies; 2429
sample points). Similarly to my current analysis, Gallo et al. only used forecasts from “veteran”
forecasters that forecasted at least 61% of the sample to avoid problems arising from irregular
participation in the survey. Gallo et al. estimated (2) using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and
then pooled the results. Their results for forecasts of U.S. GDP growth are (t-statistics are in
parentheses under coefficient estimates, adjusted R2 = .79):
!
!!,!
=

0.38
0.85 !
0.04 !
0.20 !
+
!
+
!
−
!
(8.36) (47.86) !,!!! (3.36) !,!!! (−3.74) !,!!!

(3)

These results indicate, that on average, the persistence of a forecaster’s forecast from the
previous period to the current period is high, with a weight of 0.85 put on the lagged individual
forecast. Additionally, the forecasters updated their forecast by putting a weight of 0.04 on the
lagged consensus forecast from the previous period. The final term indicates that as forecasters
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approach the target period, the variance of individual forecasts around the consensus forecast
decreases 20% each period leading to the final period of the forecasting horizon.
5.2. Baseline Specification of Empirical Model
In my empirical analysis, I first replicate Gallo et al.’s (2002) model using a slightly
different specification:
!
y!! = α + β! y!-‐!
+ β! y!-‐! + ε!

(4)

There are two main differences between my baseline model (4) and Gallo et al.’s (2002) model
(2). First, I estimate my model using random effects.22 Second, I exclude the spread term from
Gallo et al.’s (2002) model because it does not provide value in this analysis.23 Also, instead of
using Gallo et al.’s j+1 notation of the current period, I use t to represent the current period in
models (4) and (5). Otherwise, the dependent variable y! , β! , β! , and   ε! have the same
interpretation as Gallo et al.’s (2002) empirical model.
5.3. Complete Empirical Model
The complete empirical model used in this analysis alters the Gallo et al. (2002) model
(2) and my baseline model (4) to examine the theories presented in this paper:
!
!!! = ! + !! !!!!,!
+ !! !!!!,! +
!

!! !
!

!! !!!! × !
22
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!!!
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− !!,!!!
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!!,!!!
− !!,!!!
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!!![(!!,!!!
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Due to the use of panel data in this analysis, there was significant serial correlation present in the model estimates.
This serial correlation was corrected by including select lagged values of the dependent variable as independent
variables in the model. Tables IV through IX, which provide detailed estimates of specifications (4) and (5),
elaborate on which lags were used when evaluating each specification. Due to the unbalanced nature of the dataset
and forecasters’ frequent entry and exit from the sample over the year, this correction significantly decreased the
number of observations in the dataset. For additional information, see the Results section.
23
The fourth term of the Gallo et al. (2002) model (σ!!,!!! ) estimates the spread of forecasts in a sample. I have
chosen to omit this term because it is unrelated to the question at hand. This removal eliminates the need for the j in
the subscript, as I are uninterested the number of periods to the target period. Other studies, such as Pons-Novell
(2004), that employ a similar model to evaluate herding behavior, exclude this term as well.
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The dependent variable y! , β! , β! , and ε! have the same interpretation as the baseline model (4).
The only change is the addition of !  to indicate that these are values for the current year. The
current model adds four additional terms to test the theories proposed above. The third term,
!
!

!
!!!

!
!!,!!!
− !!,!!!

!

, measures the average individual squared error for forecaster i over

the previous year, ! − 1 (forecasted value in month t, !!! minus the actual value  !! ) for the  ω
months the individual forecasted over the previous year, ! − 1 (i.e., if it were any month in year
!, the measure of individual errors would include the average squared errors of the individual
forecaster over the previous calendar year, January to December of year ! − 1) for the i
!

forecasters that forecasted in that period. Similarly, the fourth term,  !"

!"
!!![(!!,!!!

−!!,!!! )! ],

measures the consensus squared error over the previous year. Because there is a consensus
forecast for each month, instead of a forecaster entering and exiting the sample over the year, ω
!

is changed to 12 from the previous term. The fifth term, !!!! × !

!
!!!

!
!!,!!!
− !!,!!!

!

, is

an interaction of the second term (lagged consensus) with the third term (average individual
!

errors over the previous year). The sixth term, y!-‐! × !"

!"
!!![(y!,!-‐!

-‐y!,!-‐! )! ] , is an interaction

of the second term (lagged consensus) with the fourth term (average consensus errors over the
previous year).
The coefficients of β! and β! are necessary to evaluate the Mud on Your Face and the
Transitory Wisdom of Crowds theories. By interacting the weight each forecaster places on the
lagged consensus with both their recent individual accuracy and the recent accuracy of the
consensus forecast, these terms measure the relationship between forecasters’ propensity to herd
and their forecasting performance versus the forecasting performance of the consensus. The
coefficient on the fifth term, β! , measures the interaction between a forecaster’s propensity to
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herd and his accuracy over the previous calendar year. If the coefficient β! is positive, it
indicates that as an individual’s errors from the previous year increase, his propensity to herd
increases. This term is used to test the Mud on Your Face theory, which predicts that herding
behavior is motivated by individual performance. The Mud on Your Face theory predicts β! will
be negative, indicating that as each forecaster’s inaccuracy increases, their herding behavior will
decrease. Recall that this relationship is expected because greater individual errors lead to
reputational losses, forecasters falling into the loss domain and becoming risk taking
The coefficient on the sixth term,  β! , estimates the interaction between forecasters’
propensity to herd and the accuracy of the consensus forecast over the previous year. If the
coefficient β! is positive, it indicates that as consensus errors increase, herding also increases.
This term is used to evaluate the Theory of the Transitory Wisdom of Crowds, which predicts
that the propensity to herd is a negative function of consensus forecast accuracy, and
consequently predicts the coefficient will be negative.
The coefficient on the third term,  β! , represents the average impact of each individual
forecaster’s accuracy over the previous calendar year on their current period forecast. If
coefficient  β! is positive, it indicates that as an individual’s errors over the previous year
increase, that individual’s forecast over the current year increases. The coefficient on the fourth
term,  β! , has the same interpretation, however it is based on the recent accuracy of the consensus
forecast. Based on the findings of Zarnowitz (1984, 1992) and Schuh (2001), I expect that
forecasters’ errors will be highest during recessionary periods following unexpected adverse
economic shocks.24 Consequently, the expected signs on both of these terms for the GNP
estimations are positive because forecasters will likely predict a economic recovery following
24

Although there are also extreme positive shocks leading to opposite error patterns, these periods are rare and
generally shorter than the periods of recession. Consequently, I expect the anticipated relationship to prevail.
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recessions, assuming the recessions in the sample last on average one year or less. However, the
expected signs for the unemployment estimations are negative, due to decreases in
unemployment following recessions.
6. Results
6.1 Serial Correlation
The presence of serial correlation significantly affected the estimations of specifications
(4) and (5). Models (4) and (5) include a fixed correction for first-order serial correlation:
forecaster i's previous period forecast. After thorough analysis of the data, it became apparent
that each of the four datasets (entire sample vs. veterans; GNP vs. unemployment) had more
complex structures of serial correlation. To correct for potential bias arising from serial
correlation, I included lags of the dependent variable as explanatory variables when estimating
(4) and (5).25 To achieve uniformity in my estimates, I also estimated the veterans subsample of
each dataset using the correction for serial correlation germane to the entire sample and I
estimated the entire sample of each dataset using the correction for serial correlation derived
from the veterans subsample.
Table III provides an overview of all estimations of specification (5) for veterans’ and the
entire samples’ forecasts of GNP growth and unemployment rates using a baseline correction for
first-order serial correlation (first, third, fifth and seventh columns) as well as a sample-specific
correction for serial correlation (second, fourth, sixth and eighth columns).26 Table IV includes
detailed estimates of (4) and (5) for the entire samples’ and veterans’ forecasts of GNP growth

25

When estimating the unique structure of serial correlation for each dataset, I began by estimating (4) and (5) with
11 lags, the greatest theoretical number of periods an individual’s forecast could persist. I then eliminated the lags,
one by one, starting with the oldest lag. When I reached a lag with a significant z-score (p-value < .05), I left that
lag in the estimation and continued eliminating insignificant lags until all remaining lags were significant.
26
The final row of Tables III, IV, V, VI, VII, VII and IX include which lags of the dependent variable were used to
correct for serial correlation.
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using the naïve correction for first-order serial correlation. Tables V and VI provide detailed
estimates of (4) and (5) for the entire samples’ and veterans’ forecasts of GNP growth using
serial correlation corrections determined from the entire sample and the veterans subsample,
respectively. Table VII includes detailed estimates of (4) and (5) for the entire samples’ and
veterans’ forecasts of unemployment rates using the naïve correction for first-order serial
correlation. Tables VIII and IX provide detailed estimates of (4) and (5) for the entire samples’
and veterans’ forecasts of unemployment rates using serial correlation corrections determined
from the entire sample and the veterans subsample, respectively.
Section 6.2 includes results from the naïve estimation of (4) and (5) with corrections for
only first-order serial correlation. Section 6.3 includes results from (4) and (5) using samplespecific corrections for serial correlation.
6.2 Results Corrected for First-Order Serial Correlation
Subsections 6.2.1, 6.2.2, 6.2.3 and 6.2.4 include the regression results for all four datasets
using naïve corrections for only first-order serial correlation.
6.2.1 Entire Sample GNP
The results of the baseline specification (4) for the entire sample’s forecast of GNP are
presented in Table IV. The coefficient on the first term, the lagged individual forecast, indicates
that on average, when all forecasters revised their forecasts of GNP, they placed a 0.7873 weight
on their previous period forecast. The coefficient on the second term, the lagged consensus
forecast, indicates that on average, when all forecasters revised their forecasts of GNP, they
placed a 0.2208 weight on the lagged consensus forecast, showing a significant tendency to herd
to the consensus. As expected, the z-scores for these coefficients are significant, indicating a
strong persistence of an individual’s forecast from one period to the next, as well as significant
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herding to the lagged consensus in forecast revisions. Additionally, the summation of the two
coefficients, 1.0081, is extremely close to 1, indicating that the entire current period forecast is
on average a combination of weights placed on the individual’s previous period forecast and the
lagged consensus forecast.
Table IV also includes the results of the estimation of specification (5) for the entire
sample. The results provide support for the Theory of the Transitory Wisdom of Crowds but not
for the Mud on Your Face Theory, indicating that all forecasters considered the recent accuracy
of the consensus forecast when choosing their herding parameter. The coefficient on the fifth
term, the interaction between lagged individual squared errors and the lagged consensus (!! ), is
negative as expected but the z-score is not statistically significant. The coefficient on this term,
-0.002, indicates that after controlling for an interaction between herding and recent consensus
squared errors, as a forecaster’s average squared errors over the previous year increased by one
percent, the weight that forecaster placed on the lagged consensus forecast when revising his
current period forecast decreased by 0.002 from the initial weight placed on the lagged
consensus forecast given by the second coefficient, 0.2502. For example, if a forecaster’s
squared errors over the previous year increased by 1%, his weight on the lagged consensus
(propensity to herd) would decrease from 0.2502 to 0.2522. Clearly, the magnitude of the
coefficient is not economically significant because the coefficient is less than 1% of the baseline
propensity to herd. Although the sign on this coefficient is negative as expected, this result does
not provide support for the Mud on Your Face Theory because the z-score of the coefficient is
not statistically significant and the magnitude of the coefficient is not economically significant.
However, the coefficient on the sixth term, the interaction between recent consensus
squared errors and the lagged consensus (!! ), is negative as expected and the z-score is
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statistically significant, which provides support for the Theory of the Transitory Wisdom of
Crowds. The coefficient on this term, -.0755, indicates that after controlling for an interaction
between herding and recent individual squared errors, as the squared errors of the consensus
from the previous year increase by one percent, the average weight a forecaster placed on the
lagged consensus forecast when revising his current period forecast decreased by 0.0755. For
example, if the squared errors of the consensus over the previous year increased by 1%, a
forecaster’s weight on the lagged consensus (propensity to herd) would decrease from 0.2502 to
0.1747. This result supports the Theory of the Transitory Wisdom of Crowds, which predicts
that as the recent errors of the consensus increase, forecasters’ propensity to herd decreases and
they deviate from the lagged consensus.
The other terms in the model also provide useful information regarding forecaster
behavior. The first coefficient, (!! ), indicates that on average, each forecaster placed a 0.7901
weight on their previous period forecast when revising their forecast. This weight is very similar
to the estimate in the baseline model (4), 0.7873. The third coefficient (!! ), indicates that on
average, as forecasters’ squared errors increased by 1% over the previous year, their current
period forecasts were on average 0.0002% higher. Similarly, the fourth coefficient (!! ),
indicates that as the squared errors of the consensus increased by one percent over the previous
year, on average forecasters’ current period forecasts were on average 0.2351% higher. As
expected, the third and fourth coefficients are positive, indicating that following periods of high
individual and consensus errors, likely due to an adverse economic shock, forecasters projected
higher GNP growth rates as they predicted that the economy would recover from the shock. 27

27

This explanation assumes that the recessions in the sample lasted on average less than one year. The mean
duration of the three recessions in the sample (July 1990-March 1991, March 2001-November 2001, December
2007-December 2008 (end of sample); defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research) was 9 and 1/3
months (NBER, 2010).
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6.2.2. Veterans GNP
The results of the baseline specification (4) for veterans’ forecasts of GNP growth are
presented in Table IV. The coefficient on the first term, the lagged individual forecast, indicates
that on average, when veterans revised their forecasts, they placed a 0.6413 weight on their
previous period forecast. The coefficient on the second term, the lagged consensus forecast,
indicates that on average, when veterans revised their forecast, they placed a 0.374 weight on the
lagged consensus forecast, showing a significant tendency to herd to the consensus. As
expected, the z-scores for these coefficients are highly significant, indicating a strong persistence
of an individuals’ forecasts from one period to the next, as well as significant herding to the
lagged consensus in forecast revisions. Similarly to the GNP data for the entire sample, the
summation of the two coefficients, 1.0153, is extremely close to 1. It is interesting to note the
difference in these estimates compared to the estimates of Gallo et al. (2002). Recall that Gallo
et al. found that forecasters placed a 0.85 weight on their previous period forecast and a 0.04
weight on the lagged consensus when revising their forecast. The current estimates indicate that
forecasters placed a significantly smaller weight on their previous period forecast and a much
greater weight on the lagged consensus forecast, displaying a significantly greater propensity to
herd. The difference in results may be attributable to differences in the sample period and the
different source of forecasts.
Table IV also includes the results of the estimation of specification (5). The results
provide support for the Theory of the Transitory Wisdom of Crowds but not for the Mud on
Your Face Theory, indicating that veteran forecasters considered the recent accuracy of the
consensus forecast when choosing their herding parameter. Similarly to the entire sample, the
coefficient on the fifth term, the interaction between lagged individual squared errors and the
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lagged consensus (!! ), is negative as expected but the z-score is not statistically significant. The
coefficient on this term, -0.0084, indicates that after controlling for an interaction between
herding and recent consensus accuracy, as a veteran’s average squared errors over the previous
year increased by one percent, the weight that forecaster placed on the lagged consensus forecast
when revising their current period forecast decreased by 0.0084 from the initial weight given by
the second coefficient, 0.4186. Similarly to the entire sample, it is clear that the coefficient is
economically insignificant because it is only 2% of the initial herding parameter.
The coefficient on the sixth term, the interaction between the lagged consensus squarederrors and the lagged consensus (!! ), is negative and the z-score is statistically significant. The
coefficient on this term, -0.0736, indicates that after controlling for an interaction between
herding and recent individual squared errors, as the average squared errors of the consensus over
the previous year increased by one percent, the average weight a veteran placed on the lagged
consensus forecast when revising their current period forecast decreased by 0.0736 from the
initial weight given by the second coefficient, 0.4168. This result provides support for the
Theory of the Transitory Wisdom of Crowds, indicating that as the recent errors of the consensus
increased, forecasters’ propensity to herd decreased.
The other terms in the model provide additional insight into macroforecaster behavior.
The first coefficient, (!! ), indicates that on average, each forecaster placed a 0.6407 weight on
their previous period forecast when revising their forecast. This weight is very similar to the
estimate in the baseline model (4), 0.6413. Additionally, the third coefficient (!! ), indicates that
for every additional 1% of squared-errors in an individual’s forecast over the previous year, their
current period forecast was on average 0.0206% higher. Similarly, the fourth coefficient (!! ),
indicates that for every additional 1% of squared-errors in an individual’s forecast over the
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previous year, their current period forecast was on average 0.2197% higher. As expected, the
signs of the third and fourth coefficients are positive, indicating that following periods of high
individual and consensus errors, forecasters forecasted higher GNP growth rates.
6.2.3 Entire Sample Unemployment
The results of the baseline specification (4) for the entire samples’ forecasts of
unemployment rates are presented in Table V. The coefficient on the first term, the lagged
individual forecast, indicates that on average, when all forecasters revised their forecasts of
unemployment, they placed a 0.712 weight on their previous period forecast. The coefficient on
the second term, the lagged consensus forecast, indicates that on average, when all forecasters
revised their forecasts of unemployment, they placed a 0.2925 weight on the lagged consensus
forecast, showing a significant tendency to herd to the consensus. As expected, the z-scores for
these coefficients are highly significant, indicating a strong persistence of an individual’s
forecast from one period to the next, as well as significant herding to the lagged consensus in
forecast revisions. Additionally, as expected, the summation of the two coefficients, 1.0045, is
extremely close to 1.
Table V also includes the results of the estimation of specification (5). The results do not
provide support for the Mud on Your Face Theory and challenge the Theory of the Wisdom of
Crowds. The coefficient on the fifth term, the interaction between lagged individual squared
errors and the lagged consensus (!! ), is unexpectedly positive but the z-score is statistically
insignificant. The coefficient on this term, 0.0003, indicates that after controlling for an
interaction between herding and recent consensus squared errors, as a forecaster’s average
squared errors over the previous year increased by one percent, the weight that forecaster placed
on the lagged consensus forecast in his current period forecast increased by 0.0003 from the
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initial herding parameter, 0.2789. It is clear, however, that the magnitude of the coefficient is
economically insignificant as it is only .1% of the baseline herding parameter.
The coefficient on the sixth term, the interaction between lagged consensus squared
errors and the lagged consensus (!! ), is unexpectedly positive and the z-score is statistically
significant, challenging the Theory of the Wisdom of Crowds. The coefficient on this term,
0.1447, indicates that after controlling for an interaction between herding and recent consensus
squared errors, as a forecaster’s average squared errors over the previous year increase by one
percent, the weight that forecaster placed on the lagged consensus forecast in his current period
forecast increased by 0.1447 from the initial herding parameter, 0.2789. This unexpected result
may be explained by the more frequent availability of information regarding unemployment rates
versus GNP growth rates, which would allow forecasters to revise their perceptions of consensus
accuracy more frequently. Consequently, the one-year window used in this analysis to evaluate
the recent accuracy of the consensus forecast may not accurately depict how forecasters judge
the accuracy of the consensus for unemployment forecasts.
The coefficients for the lagged individual forecast and lagged consensus forecast are
statistically significant and similar to the estimates in specification (4) (0.5439 and 0.4912,
respectively). The coefficient on the third term, recent individual squared error, -0.9197, is
negative as expected and statistically significant, indicating that following periods of high
individual and consensus errors, likely due to an adverse economic shock, forecasters projected
lower unemployment rates as they predicted that the economy would recover from the shock.
The coefficient of the fourth term, recent consensus squared errors (0.0003), is unexpectedly
positive, however it is statistically and economically insignificant.
6.2.4 Veterans Unemployment
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The results of the baseline specification (4) for veterans’ forecasts of unemployment are
presented in Table V. The coefficient on the first term, the lagged individual forecast, indicates
that on average, when veterans revised their forecasts of the unemployment rate, they placed a
0.7074 weight on their previous period forecast. The coefficient on the second term, the lagged
consensus forecast, indicates that on average, when veterans revised their forecast of the
unemployment rate, they placed a 0.2947 weight on the lagged consensus forecast, showing a
significant tendency to herd to the consensus. As expected, the z-scores for these coefficients are
significant, indicating a strong persistence of an individual’s forecast from one period to the next,
as well as significant herding to the lagged consensus in forecast revisions. Additionally, the
summation of the two coefficients, 1.0021, is extremely close to 1, indicating that the current
period forecast is a combination of weights placed on the individual’s previous period forecast
and the lagged consensus forecast.28
Table V also includes the results of the estimation of specification (5) for veterans’
forecasts of unemployment rates. The results do not provide support for either the Mud on Your
Face Theory or the Theory of the Transitory Wisdom of Crowds. The coefficient on the fifth
term, the interaction between lagged individual squared errors and the lagged consensus (!! ), is
unexpectedly positive, however the z-score is statistically insignificant. It is fair to assume that
the small magnitude (0.0161) implies that this term is not economically significant and therefore
it does not provide support for or challenge the Mud on Your Face Theory.
The coefficient on the sixth term, the interaction between lagged consensus squared
errors and the lagged consensus (!! ), is also unexpectedly positive, the z-score is not statistically
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These estimates cannot be compared to the results of Gallo et al. (2002), as Gallo’s model was only used for
estimates of economic output and not other variables, such as unemployment.
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significant and the magnitude is not economically significant. Consequently, this result does not
provide support for or challenge the Theory of the Transitory Wisdom of Crowds.
The only statistically significant coefficients in this specification are the first and second
terms, lagged individual forecast (0.7082) and lagged consensus forecast (0.2923). The
similarity between these estimates and the equivalent naïve baseline estimates, in addition to the
similar Wald ! ! and !! values of the models (356180.03 vs. 356231.54 and 0.9836 vs. 0.9836
for the baseline and full specifications, respectively), indicate that the addition of the recent
individual and consensus accuracy and interaction terms in this specification do not provide
significant additional explanatory power. Consequently, it is reasonable to dismiss the
unexpected signs of the added terms.
6.3 Results Corrected for Additional Degrees of Serial Correlation
Subsections 6.3.1, 6.3.2, 6.3.3 and 6.3.4 include the regression results for all four datasets
using sample-specific corrections for serial correlation.
6.3.1 Entire Sample GNP
The results of the baseline specification (4) correcting for first, second, third and seventh
order serial correlation for the entire sample’s forecast of GNP are presented in Table VI. The
coefficient on the first term, the lagged individual forecast, indicates that on average, when all
forecasters revised their forecasts of GNP, they placed a 0.8645 weight on their previous period
forecast. The coefficient on the second term, the lagged consensus forecast, indicates that on
average, when all forecasters revised their forecasts of GNP, they placed a 0.1427 weight on the
lagged consensus forecast, showing a significant tendency to herd to the consensus. As
expected, the z-scores for these coefficients are significant, indicating a strong persistence of an
individual’s forecast from one period to the next, as well as significant herding to the lagged
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consensus in forecast revisions. Also, as expected, the summation of the two coefficients,
1.0072, is extremely close to 1. These estimates are very similar to the comparable estimates in
the naïve model (0.7873 and 0.2208 for the first and second terms, respectively), which only
corrects for first-order serial correlation.
Table VI also includes the results of the estimation of specification (5) for the entire
sample correcting for first, third, sixth, ninth and tenth order serial correlation. The results
provide support for the Mud on Your Face Theory but not the Theory of the Transitory Wisdom
of Crowds, indicating that all forecasters considered their recent accuracy when choosing their
herding parameter. The coefficient on the fifth term, the interaction between lagged individual
squared errors and the lagged consensus (!! ), is negative as expected and the z-score is
statistically significant. The coefficient on this term, -0.0253, indicates that after controlling for
an interaction between herding and recent consensus squared errors, as a forecaster’s average
squared errors over the previous year increased by one percentage point, the weight that
forecaster placed on the lagged consensus forecast when revising his current period forecast
decreased by 0.0253 from the initial herding parameter, 0.6671. For example, if a forecaster’s
squared errors over the previous year increased by 1%, his propensity to herd would decrease
from 0.6671 to 0.6418. Although the magnitude of this coefficient is somewhat small relative to
the initial herding parameter, it is clear that forecasters’ propensity to herd decreased as their
recent individual errors increased, providing support for the Mud on Your Face Theory.
The coefficient on the sixth term, the interaction between recent consensus squared errors
and the lagged consensus (!! ), is unexpectedly positive but the z-score is not statistically
significant, which does not provide support for or challenge the Theory of the Transitory
Wisdom of Crowds. The coefficient of this term, 0.0143, indicates that after controlling for an
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interaction between herding and recent individual squared errors, as the squared errors of the
consensus over the previous year increased by one percent, the average weight a forecaster
placed on the lagged consensus forecast when revising his current period forecast increased by
0.0143. Although the sign of this coefficient contradicts the Theory of the Transitory Wisdom of
Crowds, I dismiss the incongruence due to the small magnitude of the coefficient (2.1% of the
initial herding parameter) and statistical insignificance of the estimate.
The other terms in the model also provide useful information regarding forecaster
behavior. The first coefficient, (!! ), indicates that on average, each forecaster placed a 0.3448
weight on their previous period forecast when revising their forecast. This weight is very
different from the estimate in the baseline model (4), 0.8645, and is also quite different from the
comparable coefficient in the model with the naïve corrections for serial correlation, 0.7901. A
possible explanation for this inconsistency is the use of a more complicated correction for serial
correlation as well as the additional explanatory variables included in specification (5). The third
coefficient (!! ), indicates that on average, as an individual forecaster’s squared errors increased
by one percent over the previous year, their current period forecast was on average 0.0729%
higher. Similarly, the fourth coefficient (!! ), indicates that as the squared errors of the
consensus forecast increased by one percent over the previous year, on average forecasters’
current period forecasts were 0.0531% lower. As expected, the third coefficient is positive,
indicating that following periods of high individual errors, forecasters projected higher GNP
growth. However, the sign of the fourth coefficient is unexpectedly negative. A possible
explanation for this outcome is that individual forecast errors are more highly correlated with
recessionary periods than consensus errors, and that fluctuations in consensus accuracy are
driven by other factors, such as the Theory of the Transitory Wisdom of Crowds.
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6.3.2. Veterans GNP
The results of the baseline specification (4) for veterans’ forecasts of GNP growth
correcting for first, second, third, sixth, eighth and ninth order serial correlation are presented in
Table VII. The coefficient of the first term, the lagged individual forecast, indicates that on
average, when veterans revised their forecasts, they placed a 0.4585 weight on their previous
period forecast. The coefficient on the second term, the lagged consensus forecast, indicates that
on average, when veterans revised their forecasts, they placed a 0.6151 weight on the lagged
consensus forecast, showing a significant tendency to herd to the consensus. As expected, the zscores for these coefficients are highly significant, indicating a strong persistence of individuals’
forecasts from one period to the next, as well as significant herding to the lagged consensus in
forecast revisions. Similarly to the GNP data for the entire sample, the summation of the two
coefficients, 1.0736, is very close to 1. It is interesting to note the difference in these estimates
compared to the estimates of Gallo et al. (2002). Recall that Gallo et al. found that forecasters
placed a 0.85 weight on their previous period forecast and a 0.04 weight on the lagged consensus
when revising their forecast. The current estimates indicate that forecasters place a significantly
smaller weight on their previous forecast and a much greater weight on the lagged consensus,
displaying a significantly greater propensity to herd.
Table VII also includes the results of the estimation of specification (5) using corrections
for first, third, sixth, eighth and ninth order serial correlation. The results provide marginal
support for the Mud on Your Face Theory but not for the Theory of the Transitory Wisdom of
Crowds, indicating that veteran forecasters considered their recent accuracy when choosing their
herding parameter. Similarly to the entire sample, the coefficient on the fifth term, the
interaction between lagged individual squared errors and the lagged consensus (!! ), is negative
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as expected and the z-score is statistically significant. The coefficient on this term, -0.0210,
indicates that after controlling for an interaction between herding and recent consensus accuracy,
as a veteran’s average squared errors over the previous year increased by one percent, the weight
that forecaster placed on the lagged consensus forecast when revising his current period forecast
decreased by 0.0210 from the initial herding parameter, 0.6447. It is important to note that even
though the coefficient is statistically significant, the magnitude of the coefficient is quite small
relative to the initial herding parameter, indicating that when forecasters’ errors increase, their
propensity to herd only decreases marginally, which provides limited support for the Mud on
Your Face Theory.
The coefficient on the sixth term, the interaction between the lagged consensus squarederrors and the lagged consensus (!! ), is unexpectedly positive but the z-score is statistically
insignificant and the magnitude is economically insignificant. The coefficient on this term, 0.0047, indicates that after controlling for an interaction between herding and recent individual
squared errors, as the average squared errors of the consensus over the previous year increased
by one percent, the average weight a veteran placed on the lagged consensus forecast when
revising his current period forecast decreased by 0.0047 from the initial herding parameter,
0.6447. Due to the economic and statistical insignificance of this result, it does not support or
challenge the Theory of the Transitory Wisdom of Crowds.
The other terms in the model provide additional insight into macroforecaster behavior.
The first coefficient, (!! ), indicates that on average, each forecaster placed a 0.4116 weight on
their previous period forecast when revising their forecast. This weight is very similar to the
estimate in the baseline model (4), 0.4585. Additionally, the third coefficient (!! ), indicates that
for every additional 1% of squared-errors in an individual’s forecast over the previous year, their
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current period forecast was on average 0.0660% higher. Similarly, the fourth coefficient (!! ),
indicates that for every additional 1% of squared-errors in an individual’s forecast over the
previous year, their current period forecast was on average 0.0210% lower. As expected, the
sign of the third coefficient is positive, indicating that following periods of high individual
errors, forecasters forecasted higher GNP growth rates. However, similarly to the entire sample,
the sign on the fourth coefficient is unexpectedly negative.
6.3.3 Entire Sample Unemployment
The results of the baseline specification (4) for the entire samples’ forecasts of
unemployment rates correcting for first, fourth, seventh and ninth order serial correlation are
presented in Table VIII. The coefficient on the first term, the lagged individual forecast,
indicates that on average, when all forecasters revised their forecast of unemployment, they
placed a 0.4588 weight on their previous period forecast. The coefficient on the second term, the
lagged consensus forecast, indicates that on average, when all forecasters revised their forecasts
of unemployment, they placed a 0.5624 weight on the lagged consensus forecast, showing a
significant tendency to herd to the consensus. As expected, the z-scores for these coefficients are
highly significant, indicating a strong persistence of an individual’s forecast from one period to
the next, as well as significant herding to the lagged consensus in forecast revisions. Also, as
expected, the summation of the two coefficients, 1.0212, is extremely close to 1.
Table VIII also includes the results of the estimation of specification (5) corrected for
first, second, third, fourth, sixth and ninth order serial correlation. The results provide support
for the Theory of the Transitory Wisdom of Crowds but not for the Mud on Your Face Theory.
The coefficient on the fifth term, the interaction between lagged individual squared errors and
the lagged consensus (!! ), is negative as expected but the z-score is statistically insignificant and
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the magnitude is economically insignificant. The coefficient on this term, -0.0019, indicates that
after controlling for an interaction between herding and recent consensus squared errors, as a
forecaster’s average squared errors over the previous year increased by one percent, the weight
that forecaster placed on the lagged consensus forecast in his current period forecast decreased
by 0.0019 from the initial herding parameter, 0.6087. However, it is clear that the magnitude of
the coefficient is economically insignificant as it is only .3% of the baseline herding parameter.
The coefficient on the sixth term, the interaction between lagged consensus squared
errors and the lagged consensus (!! ), is negative as expected and the z-score is statistically
significant, providing support for the Theory of the Transitory Wisdom of Crowds. The
coefficient on this term, -0.0852 indicates that after controlling for an interaction between
herding and recent consensus squared errors, as a forecaster’s average squared errors over the
previous year increased by one percent, the weight that forecaster placed on the lagged
consensus forecast in their current period forecast decreased by 0.0852 from the initial herding
parameter, 0.6087. This result provides support for the Theory of the Transitory Wisdom of
Crowds, which predicts that forecasters’ propensity to herd will decrease as the recent errors of
the consensus forecast increase.
The coefficients for the lagged individual forecast and lagged consensus forecast are
statistically significant and similar to the estimates in specification (4) (0.3657 and 0.6087,
respectively). The coefficient on the third term, recent individual squared error (0.0044) is
unexpectedly positive but statistically and economically insignificant. The coefficient on the
fourth term, recent consensus squared error (0.5246), is also unexpectedly positive, however it is
statistically and economically significant.
6.3.4 Veterans Unemployment
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The results of the baseline specification (4) for veterans’ forecasts of unemployment
correcting for first, second and fourth order serial correlation are presented in Table IX. The
coefficient on the first term, the lagged individual forecast, indicates that on average, when
veterans revised their forecasts of the unemployment rate, they placed a 0.5264 weight on their
previous period forecast. The coefficient on the second term, the lagged consensus forecast,
indicates that on average, when veterans revised their forecast of unemployment, they placed a
0.4759 weight on the lagged consensus forecast, showing a significant tendency to herd to the
consensus. As expected, the z-scores for these coefficients are significant, indicating a strong
persistence of an individual’s forecast from one period to the next, as well as significant herding
to the lagged consensus in forecast revisions. Additionally, the summation of the two
coefficients, 1.0023, is very close to 1.
Table IX also includes the results of the estimation of specification (5) for veterans’
forecasts of unemployment rates including corrections for first, second and fourth order serial
correlation. The results do not provide support for the Mud on Your Face Theory and challenge
the Theory of the Transitory Wisdom of Crowds. The coefficient of the fifth term, the
interaction between lagged individual squared errors and the lagged consensus (!! ), is
unexpectedly positive, however the z-score is statistically insignificant. It is fair to assume that
the small magnitude (0.0054) implies that the term is economically insignificant, and therefore it
does not provide support for or challenge the Mud on Your Face Theory.
The coefficient of the sixth term, 0.0339, the interaction between lagged consensus
squared errors and the lagged consensus (!! ), is unexpectedly positive and the z-score is
statistically significant. This result indicates that following large consensus errors, forecasters
choose to herd more to the consensus, which challenges the Theory of the Transitory Wisdom of
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Crowds. However, due to the relatively small magnitude of the coefficient, it is reasonable to
conclude that the economic significance of this unexpected result is negligible and likely not
attributable to forecasters’ perceptions of consensus accuracy.
The coefficients for the first and second terms, the lagged individual forecast (0.5252)
and lagged consensus forecast (0.4745), are both statistically significant and very similar to the
corresponding estimates in the baseline estimation (4). The coefficients for recent individual
squared errors and recent consensus squared errors are both negative as expected but only the
coefficient for the recent consensus squared error is statistically significant.
7. Conclusion
Herding occurs in social environments when agents mimic others either to improve their
own performance by utilizing the hard-fought information of other agents or to protect their
reputation by running with the pack. In the past most research on herding in economic settings
has focused on explaining variations in herding behavior across agents. For example, Lamont
(2002) found that more experienced forecasters herd less than their less experienced counterparts
because their clients already know their ability. The goal of this thesis was to study variation in
herding behavior over time rather than across agents.
To do so I evaluated the propensity to herd over time of forecasters who participate in the
survey conducted by the Blue Chip Economic Indicators newsletter from 1984-2008. I
developed two theories designed to explain changes in the propensity to herd over time. The
Mud on Your Face theory predicted that a forecasters’ propensity to herd is motivated by his or
her recent success. Using Prospect Theory, the Mud on Your Face theory predicts that large
forecasting errors hurt a forecaster’s reputation and put them in the loss domain. Consequently,
they become risk-taking and have an incentive to deviate more from the consensus.
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Alternatively, during periods of small individual errors, the theory predicts that forecasters
experience risk aversion and a stronger incentive to herd. The Transitory Wisdom of Crowds
theory predicted that herding behavior is driven by the recent accuracy of the consensus forecast.
Specifically, when the consensus forecast is accurate, forecasters are more likely to herd because
they believe the consensus includes valuable private information and is therefore a better target
to herd to, compared to periods of large consensus errors.
The results are quite noteworthy and provide support for both theories. The GNP
forecasting data for both the veterans and the entire sample using the naïve correction for firstorder serial correlation provides strong support for the Theory of the Transitory Wisdom of
Crowds, which predicts that forecasters choose their herding behavior based on the recent
accuracy of the consensus forecast. Additionally, the GNP forecasting data for both the veterans
and the entire sample corrected for complex forms of serial correlation provide strong support for
the Mud on Your Face Theory, which predicts that forecasters choose their herding behavior
based on their recent performance.
Alternatively, the unemployment data provides no support for the Mud on Your Face
Theory and limited support for the Theory of the Transitory Wisdom of Crowds. Specifically,
after correcting the entire samples’ forecasts of unemployment for high order serial correlation,
the results provided support for the Theory of the Transitory Wisdom of Crowds. Conversely,
when only correcting for first-order serial correlation in the entire sample and higher order serial
correlation with the veteran subsample, I found unexpectedly significant results challenging the
Theory of the Transitory Wisdom of Crowds. However, after considering the magnitudes of the
relevant coefficients, I concluded that the unexpected results were likely statistical artifacts and
likely not economically relevant.
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These results provide probative value to consumers of macroeconomic forecasts,
indicating that these consumers should be mindful of the consensus’ and individual forecasters’
recent forecasting accuracy when using their forecasts. Although the results derived from GNP
and unemployment forecasts are useful for considering herding behavior for other variables, the
current results may not be generalizable to other variables. One significant downside to the
application of these results elsewhere is the different types, quality and availability of
information available for other variables. This problem is clear when comparing the results of
the GNP forecasts and the unemployment forecasts; due to the differences between the variables,
such as the release of actual values of the variables on different schedules and with varying
revisions, support for both theories was apparent with the GNP data but neither theory held with
the unemployment data.
Additionally, it would be beneficial to derive more complete theoretical models of
reputation-driven herding that generalize the assumption of risk neutrality made by Scharfstein
and Stein’s (1990) to cases where agents are either risk-averse or risk-taking depending on
whether they are operating in the domain of gains of loses.
Overall, these findings suggest that macroforecasters’ propensity to herd varies over time
and is systematically linked to past performance, both at the individual and group level. These
findings add to the existing literature which has focused almost exclusively on cross-sectional
variation in herding behavior. The finding that herding varies over time and is linked to past
performance suggests that temporal variations in herding could play a role in business cycle
dynamics. In particular, past forecasting success of the consensus could lead to increased
herding which ultimately causes the consensus to poorly aggregate private information and
become a misleading indicator of future economic activity. To the extent that the public relies
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on the consensus to plan and make economic decisions, such inaccuracy could amplify macro
shocks.
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Appendix I: Information About Forecasters in Sample
For a quantitative breakdown of the composition of the forecasters in the sample, see Table II.
Veterans: Bank of America Corp.; Bank One; USA Chamber of Commerce; Chase Manhattan
Bank; Conference Board; Chrysler; DuPont; Econoclast; Eggert Economic Enterprises; Evans,
Carrol and Associates; Georgia State; University of Maryland Inforum; La Salle National Bank;
Macroeconomic Advisors, LLC; Merrill Lynch; Morgan Stanley & Co.; National City
Corporation; North Trust Company; Prudential Financial; Prudential Equity Group; SOM
Economics Inc.; Turning Point (Micrometrics); U.S. Trust Co.; UCLA Business Forecast;
Wayne Hummer & Co.
Entire Sample:
Industrial Organizations: Caterpillar; USA Chamber of Commerce; Conference Board; Chrysler;
Dun & Bradstreet; DuPont; Eaton Corporation; Fannie Mae; Fedex Corp.; Ford Motor Comp.;
General Motors Corporation; Metropolitan Insurance; Motorola, Inc.; National Association of
Home Builders; National Association of Realtors; Pennzoil Co.; Prudential Financial; Sears
Roebuck; Swiss RE; W.R. Grace Co.; Weyerhaueser Co.; Mortgage Banker Association
Banks: Bank of America Corp.; Bank One; Bankers Trust; Barnett Banks, Inc.; Brown Brothers
Harriman; Chase Manhattan Bank; Chemical Bank; Citicorp Information Services; Comerica;
CoreStates Financial Corp.; Credit Suisse; Harris Trust & Savings Bank; Huntington National
Bank; Irving Trust Co.; JP Morgan Chase; La Salle National Bank; Marine Midland Bank;
National City Corporation; Nations Bank; Northern Trust Co.; Fleet Financial Group;
Philadelphia National Bank; PNC Financial Corp.; Security Pacific National Bank; U.S. Trust
Co.; Wells Capital Management
Securities Firms: Arnhold & S.Bleichroeder; Bear Stearns & Co., Inc.; BMO Capital Markets;
C.J. Lawrence, Inc.; Chicago Corporation; CRT Government Securities; Daiwa Research of
Institute Americas; Dean Witter Reynolds; Deutsche Banc Alex Brown; Goldman Sachs & Co.;
J.W. Coons Advisors; Lehman Brothers; Morgan Guaranty; Morgan Stanley & Co.; Nomura
Securities; Prudential Equity Group; Schwab Washington Research Group; UBS; Wachovia
Securities; Chicago Capital, Inc.; Mesirow Financials; RBS Greenwich Capital
Econometric Modelers: DRI-WEFA; Fairmodel Economica Inc.; Georgia State; University of
Maryland Inforum; Macroeconomic Advisors, LLC; Merrill Lynch; UCLA Business Forecast;
University of Michigan M.Q.E.M.
Independents: Arthur D. Little; Bostian Research Associates; Business Economics, Inc.; Cahners
Publishing Co.; Charles Reeder; Clearview Economics; Econoclast; Econoviews International,
Inc.; Eggert Economic Enterprises; Evans, Carrol and Associates; Classicalprinciples.com;
Kellner Economic Advisors; MMS International; Moody’s Capital Markets; Morris Cohen &
Associates; Naroff Economic Advisors; Peter L. Bernstein, Inc.; Polyconomics; SOM
Economics, Inc.; Standard & Poors; Stotler Economics, Inc.; Turning Points (Micrometrics);
Wayne Hummer & Co.; Pema Associates; Action Economics; Moody’seconomy.com;
Economist Intelligence Unit
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Appendix II: Granger Causality Measures of Herding
As additional evidence of herding, Granger Causality tests were used to prove that the
lagged consensus Granger-causes the current period individual forecast, implying that the current
period forecast does not cause the lagged consensus. To complete this analysis, three veterans
were randomly selected from the GNP dataset and the unemployment dataset. All six of these
forecasters provided evidence that the lagged consensus Granger-causes the current period
individual forecast.
According to Granger Causality (Granger, 1969), variable x Granger-cause variable y if:
!
!!! = !!!!
!
!
!!! = !!!!
+ !!!!

(1: Restricted)
(2: Unrestricted)

F(2) > F(1), indicating that the lagged value of variable x provides additional explanatory power
to the current period value of y, and if:
!
!!! = !!!!
!
!
!!! = !!!!
+ !!!!

(3: Restricted)
(4: Unrestricted)

F(3) = F(4), indicating that the lagged value of variable y does not provides additional
explanatory power to the current period value of x. In the context of the current analysis,
variable y is an individual forecaster’s forecast, and variable x is the consensus forecast.
1. GNP Data
The three forecasters selected from the GNP dataset were Chase Manhattan, Conference
Board, and Chrysler. For Chase Manhattan, the first F-test that the lagged consensus causes the
current period individual forecast, F(1, 189) = 34.82, p < 0.0001, and the second F-test revealed
that the lagged individual forecast does not cause the current period consensus, F(1, 189) = 0.22,
p = 0.6394, revealing that the lagged consensus Granger-causes the current period individual
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forecast. For Conference Board, the first F-test that the lagged consensus causes the current
period individual forecast, F(1, 282) = 8.16, p = 0.0046, and the second F-test revealed that the
lagged individual forecast does not cause the current period consensus, F(1, 282) = 0.16, p =
0.6894, revealing that the lagged consensus Granger-causes the current period individual
forecast. For Chrysler, the first F-test that the lagged consensus causes the current period
individual forecast, F(1, 281) = 22.17, p < 0.0001, and the second F-test revealed that the lagged
individual forecast does not cause the current period consensus, F(1, 281) = 2.31, p = 0.1299,
revealing that the lagged consensus Granger-causes the current period individual forecast.
2. Unemployment Data
The three forecasters selected from the GNP dataset were University of Maryland
Inforum, Northern Trust Company, and Turning Points (Micrometrics). For University of
Maryland Inforum, the first F-test that the lagged consensus causes the current period individual
forecast, F(1, 256) = 59.18, p < 0.0001, and the second F-test revealed that the lagged individual
forecast does not cause the current period consensus, F(1, 256) = 1.54, p = 0.2158, revealing that
the lagged consensus Granger-causes the current period individual forecast. For Northern Trust
Company, the first F-test that the lagged consensus causes the current period individual forecast,
F(1, 269) = 7.56, p = 0.0064, and the second F-test revealed that the lagged individual forecast
does not cause the current period consensus, F(1, 269) = 2.33, p = 0.1279, revealing that the
lagged consensus Granger-causes the current period individual forecast. For Turning Points
(Micrometrics), the first F-test that the lagged consensus causes the current period individual
forecast, F(1, 220) = 30.00, p < 0.0001, and the second F-test revealed that the lagged individual
forecast does not cause the current period consensus, F(1, 220) = 0.86, p = 0.3556, revealing that
the lagged consensus Granger-causes the current period individual forecast.
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Appendix III: Estimation Procedure Rationale
When estimating equations (4) and (5) using panel data, I had to choose to either use a
fixed effects regression or a random effects regression. Theoretically, fixed effects estimation is
more appropriate to the current analysis due to individual variations between the forecasters that
could be accounted for in the individually estimated intercept terms for each forecaster.
However, if fixed effects are not necessary to account for this variance, random effects
estimation is more efficient than fixed effects. To determine the appropriate estimation
procedure, I completed Hausman Tests comparing the estimates of the random effects and fixed
effects estimations of each specification. The Hausman Test compares the coefficient estimates
and variances of the coefficients of the fixed effects and random effects regressions:
(!!" − !!" )! ( !!" − !!" )
where !!" and !!" are the coefficient estimate and variance using fixed effects, respectively and
!!" and !!" are coefficient estimate using random effects, respectively. The differences of the
estimates of the estimates are then compared on a ! ! distribution:
•

!! : Coefficient estimates are consistent between fixed effects and random effects, but
only random effects is efficient

•

!! : Coefficient estimates are not consistent between fixed effects and random effects,
only fixed effects is accurate

The results of the Hausman Tests are presented in Table X29. All but one of the Hausman Test
! ! statistics are significant, providing grounds for rejecting !! in favor of !! and using fixed
effects estimation. However, after a closer look, it is clear that the estimates between fixed

29

Note: For brevity, Table X only includes Hausman Test results for the models that correct for first order serial
correlation. Additional Hausman Tests were conducted for the determined orders of serial correlation for each
subsample and yielded similar results.
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effects and random effects are not considerably different. In fact, the average actual difference
between the fixed effect and random effect estimates for all the regressions is .019975. It is
likely that although there are not considerable differences between these estimates, the Hausman
Test statistic was inflated by the sample size of each estimate. Consequently, on further review,
I chose to use random effects estimation to maximize the efficiency of the models.
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Figure 1: Individual value function derived from Prospect Theory
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Figure 2: Forecaster’s perspective during consistent growth
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Figure 3: Forecaster’s perspective after macroeconomic shock
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Figure 4a: Theory of the Transitory Wisdom of Crowds
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t=3
-Maximum Intragroup
Diversity
-Maximum Consensus
Accuracy

t=1

Begin Herding

-Decreased Intragroup
Diversity
-Decreased Consensus
Accuracy

t=2

Deviating

-Minimum Intragroup
Diversity
-Minimum Consensus
Diversity

Slowing Herding

Freedman 69

Number	
  of	
  Forecasters	
  	
  in	
  Sample	
  

Figure 5: Number of forecasters in subsample (veterans) and total sample.
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Figure 6: Actual GNP/GDP growth vs. forecasting error across time, veterans and entire sample
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Figure 7: Actual unemployment vs. forecasting error across time, veterans and entire sample
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Figure 8: Dispersion of veterans’ forecasts of GNP/GDP growth in June

Figure 9: Dispersion of veterans’ forecasts of GNP/GDP growth in December
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Figure 10: Dispersion of all forecasts of GNP/GDP growth in June

Figure 11: Dispersion of all forecasts of GNP/GDP growth in December
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Table I: Summary of predictions of Mud on Your Face Theory (1) and the Theory of the
Transitory Wisdom of Crowds (2). First 2 rows in each box provide the conditions (Accuracy of
individual and consensus); last 2 rows provide the predictions of individual herding behavior
provided by each theory.
Individual: Accurate
Consensus: Accurate
Predictions:
1: Herd
2: Herd
Individual: Inaccurate
Consensus: Accurate
Predictions:
1: Deviate
2: Herd

Individual: Accurate
Consensus: Inaccurate
Predictions:
1: Herd
2: Deviate
Individual: Inaccurate
Consensus: Inaccurate
Predictions:
1: Deviate
2: Deviate

Table II: Composition of affiliations of forecasters in subsample (veterans) and total sample
across entire sample.
Industry Affiliation of Forecasters in Dataset

Veterans
Total Sample
# of Forecasters
% # of Forecasters
%
Industrial Organization
4 16%
19 17%
Bank
7 15%
29 14%
Securities Firm
2
5%
26 14%
Econometric Forecaster
5 14%
8
5%
Independent Forecasters
7 22%
31 21%
Total
25 100%
120 100%
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Table III: Overview of regression results for all estimations of equation (5).

Overview of Results, Random Effects, Equation (5)
rGNP/rGDP
Unemployment
Entire
Entire Sample
Veterans
Veterans
Entire Entire Sample Veterans
Variable
Sample
Corrected
Corrected
Sample
Corrected
Lagged Individual Forecast
.7901**
0.3448**
0.6407**
.4116**
.7174**
.3659**
.7082**
Lagged Consensus Forecast
.2502**
.6671**
0.4168**
.6447**
.2789**
.6083**
.2923**
Recent Individual Squared Error
0.0002
.0729**
0.0206
.0661*
-0.0034
0.0039
-0.1302
Recent Consensus Squared Error
.2351**
-.0531*
0.2197**
-0.0228
-.9197**
0.5303**
-0.0763
Lagged Individual Accuracy X Lagged Consensus
-0.002
-.0253**
-0.0084
-.0210**
0.0003
-0.0018
0.0161
Lagged Consensus Accuracy X Lagged Consensus
-0.0755**
0.0143
-0.0736**
0.0047
.1447**
-.0863**
0.0117
Observations
13281
2179
5988
1550
12831
3192
5934
Forecasters
115
108
25
25
113
108
25
R2 Overall
0.9449
0.9875
0.9456
0.9858
0.9842
0.9955
0.9836
Wald Chi Squared
225913.6
171944.84
104052.09 107104.53
796392.7 708382.39
356231.54
Lags
1
1,3,6,9,10
1
1,3,6,8,9
1
1,2,3,4,6,9
1
Notes:
1. Dependent variable is the individual current period forecast of rGNP
2. Coefficient estimates reflect average across sample across time using random effects regression
3. Z-statistics (under coefficient estimates): * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%
4. Lagged values of the dependent variable included to correct for serial correlation (Reported in last row)
5. Italicized = unexpected, Bold = unexpected and significant

Veterans
Corrected
.5252**
.4745**
-0.04
-.1964*
0.0054
.0339*
4209
25
0.9892
384674.54
1,2,4
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Table IV: Regression results for GNP/GDP data using estimation equations (4) and (5),
correcting for first-degree serial correlation.
rGNP/GDP Results, Random Effects GLS, Equations (4) and (5), Correcting for First Degree Serial Correlation
Specification
(4)
(5)
Sample
Entire Sample Veterans Entire Sample Veterans
Variable
Lagged Individual Forecast
0.7873
0.6413
0.7901
0.6407
149.35**
63.51**
150.21**
64.18**
Lagged Consensus Forecast
0.2208
0.374
0.2502
0.4168
40.39**
35.59**
41.13**
36.38**
Recent Individual Squared Error
0.0002
0.0206
0.02
0.86
Recent Consensus Squared Error
0.2351
0.2197
13.31**
6.75**
Recent Individual Squared Error X Lagged Consensus
-0.002
-0.0084
-0.56
-0.94
Recent Consensus Squared Error X Lagged Consensus
-0.0755
-0.0736
-11.48**
-6.07**
Constant
0.0046
-0.0153
-0.1053
-0.145
0.8
-1.78
-10.58**
-9.59**
Observations
13788
6214
13281
5988
Individuals
115
25
115
25
R 2 Overall
0.9569
0.9575
0.9449
0.9456
Wald Chi Squared
306025.36** 140050.24** 225913.56** 104052.09**
Lags
1
1
1
1
Notes:
1. Dependent variable is the individual current period forecast of rGNP
2. Coefficient estimates reflect average across sample across time using random effects regression
3. Z-statistics (under coefficient estimates): * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%
4. Lagged values of the dependent variable included to correct for serial correlation (Reported in last row)
5. Italicized = unexpected, Bold = unexpected and significant
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Table V: Regression results for unemployment data using estimation equations (4) and (5),
correcting for first-degree serial correlation.
Unemployment Results, Random Effects GLS, Equations (4) and (5), Correcting for First Degree Serial Correlation

Specification
Sample
Variable
Lagged Individual Forecast
Lagged Consensus Forecast

(4)
Entire Sample Veterans
0.712
123.73**
0.2925
49.80**

Recent Individual Squared Error
Recent Consensus Squared Error
Recent Individual Squared Error X Lagged Consensus
Recent Consensus Squared Error X Lagged Consensus
Constant

-0.0336
-4.95
12831
113
0.9841
746187.37
1

(5)
Entire Sample Veterans

0.7074
79.97**
0.2947
32.70**

0.7174
0.7082
126.16**
79.66**
0.2789
0.2923
46.19**
31.59**
-0.0034
-0.1302
-0.05
-1.2
-0.9197
-0.0763
-5.69**
-0.77
0.0003
0.0161
0.03
0.92
0.1447
0.0117
5.64**
0.68
-0.023
0.0143
-0.0107
-2.37*
1.34
-0.75
5934
12831
5934
25
113
25
0.9836
0.9842
0.9836
356170.03** 796392.67** 356231.54**
1
1
1

Observations
Individuals
R 2 Overall
Wald Chi Squared
Lags
Notes:
1. Dependent variable is the individual current period forecast of rGNP
2. Coefficient estimates reflect average across sample across time using random effects regression
3. Z-statistics (under coefficient estimates): * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%
4. Lagged values of the dependent variable included to correct for serial correlation (Reported in last row)
5. Italicized = unexpected, Bold = unexpected and significant
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Table VI: Regression results for GNP/GDP data using estimation equations (4) and (5), using
serial correlation corrections determined from entire sample.
rGNP/GDP Results, Random Effects GLS, Equations (4) and (5), Using Serial Correlation Corrections
Determined from Entire Sample
Specification
(4)
(5)
Sample
Entire Sample Veterans Entire Sample Veterans
Variable
Lagged Individual Forecast
0.8645
0.5146
0.3448
0.3772
65.90**
21.30**
19.92**
12.95**
Lagged Consensus Forecast
0.1427
0.576
0.6671
0.6938
19.05**
26.79**
39.13**
23.96**
Recent Individual Squared Error
0.0729
0.0611
5.44**
2.33*
Recent Consensus Squared Error
-0.0531
-0.0252
-2.1*
-0.67
Recent Individual Squared Error X Lagged Consensus
-0.0253
-0.0176
-5.48**
-1.86
Recent Consensus Squared Error X Lagged Consensus
0.0143
-0.0021
1.6
-0.16
Constant
-0.0270
-0.0560
-0.0280
-0.0245
-3.55**
-5.69
-2.13*
-1.36
Observations
5839
2703
2179
1025
Individuals
112
25
108
25
R 2 Overall
0.9749
0.9812
0.9875
0.9907
Wald Chi Squared
226608.20** 141059.26** 171944.84** 107490.07**
Lags
1,2,3,7
1,2,3,7
1,3,6,9,10
1,3,6,9,10
Notes:
1. Dependent variable is the individual current period forecast of rGNP
2. Coefficient estimates reflect average across sample across time using random effects regression
3. Z-statistics (under coefficient estimates): * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%
4. Lagged values of the dependent variable included to correct for serial correlation (Reported in last row)
5. Italicized = unexpected, Bold = unexpected and significant
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Table VII: Regression results for GNP/GDP data using estimation equations (4) and (5), using
serial correlation corrections determined from veterans subsample.
rGNP/GDP Results, Random Effects GLS, Equations (4) and (5), Using Serial Correlation Corrections
Determined from Veterans Subsample
Specification
(4)
(5)
Sample
Entire Sample Veterans Entire Sample Veterans
Variable
Lagged Individual Forecast
0.8106
0.4585
0.8712
0.4116
50.04**
16.23**
66.67**
15.91**
Lagged Consensus Forecast
0.0676
0.6151
0.0886
0.6447
8.59**
23.57**
10.54**
25.14**
Recent Individual Squared Error
-0.0133
0.0660
-0.087
2.52*
Recent Consensus Squared Error
0.0336
-0.0228
1.11
-0.61
Recent Individual Squared Error X Lagged Consensus
0.0051
-0.0210
0.96
-2.21*
Recent Consensus Squared Error X Lagged Consensus
-0.0079
0.0047
-0.74
0.35
Constant
0.0042
-0.0141
-0.0556
-0.0958
0.45
-1.39
-3.54**
-5.34**
Observations
3406
1590
3313
1550
Individuals
110
25
109
25
R 2 Overall
0.9802
0.9890
0.9726
0.9858
Wald Chi Squared
22700.3** 141707.68** 117338.99** 107104.53**
Lags
1,2,3,6,8,9
1,2,3,6,8,9
1,3,6,8,9
1,3,6,8,9
Notes:
1. Dependent variable is the individual current period forecast of rGNP
2. Coefficient estimates reflect average across sample across time using random effects regression
3. Z-statistics (under coefficient estimates): * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%
4. Lagged values of the dependent variable included to correct for serial correlation (Reported in last row)
5. Italicized = unexpected, Bold = unexpected and significant
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Table VIII: Regression results for unemployment data using estimation equations (4) and (5),
using serial correlation corrections determined from entire sample.
Unemployment Results, Random Effects GLS, Equations (4) and (5), Using Serial Correlation Corrections
Determined from Entire Sample
Specification
(4)
(5)
Sample
Entire Sample Veterans Entire Sample Veterans
Variable
Lagged Individual Forecast
0.4588
0.3953
0.3657
0.2483
30.45**
16.82**
24.03**
12.02**
Lagged Consensus Forecast
0.5624
0.6162
0.6087
0.7023
38.05**
26.1**
41.38**
30.87**
Recent Individual Squared Error
0.0044
-0.0547
0.06
-0.52
Recent Consensus Squared Error
0.5246
-0.0919
3.11**
-0.89
Recent Individual Squared Error X Lagged Consensus
-0.0019
0.0114
-0.18
0.67
Recent Consensus Squared Error X Lagged Consensus
-0.0852
0.0124
-3.17**
0.69
Constant
0.0483
0.0319
0.0199
0.0412
6.78**
3.02**
1.71
2.75**
Observations
3285
1549
3191
1500
Individuals
108
25
108
25
R 2 Overall
0.9956
0.9955
0.9955
0.9953
Wald Chi Squared
737725.92** 338178.73** 708450.83** 313605.92**
Lags
1,4,7,9
1,4,7,9
1,2,3,4,6,9
1,2,3,4,6,9
Notes:
1. Dependent variable is the individual current period forecast of rGNP
2. Coefficient estimates reflect average across sample across time using random effects regression
3. Z-statistics (under coefficient estimates): * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%
4. Lagged values of the dependent variable included to correct for serial correlation (Reported in last row)
5. Italicized = unexpected, Bold = unexpected and significant
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Table IX: Regression results for GNP/GDP data using estimation equations (4) and (5), using
serial correlation corrections determined from veterans subsample.
Unemployment Results, Random Effects GLS, Equations (4) and (5), Using Serial Correlation Corrections
Determined from Veterans Subsample
Specification
(4)
(5)
Sample
Entire Sample Veterans Entire Sample Veterans
Variable
Lagged Individual Forecast
0.6163
0.5264
0.6112
0.5252
60.60**
33.98**
60.13**
33.87**
Lagged Consensus Forecast
0.4096
0.4759
0.3996
0.4745
51.16**
35.68**
48.67**
35.01**
Recent Individual Squared Error
0.1090
-0.0400
1.63
-0.39
Recent Consensus Squared Error
-1.1629
-0.1964
-7.5**
-2.08*
Recent Individual Squared Error X Lagged Consensus
-0.0156
0.0054
-1.58
0.33
Recent Consensus Squared Error X Lagged Consensus
0.1852
0.0339
7.53**
2.06*
Constant
-0.0247
-0.0349
0.0315
-0.0184*
-3.87**
-3.68**
3.03**
-1.36
Observations
9012
4209
9012
4209
Individuals
111
25
111
25
R 2 Overall
0.9894
0.9892
0.9895
0.9892
Wald Chi Squared
844571.02** 384620.15** 849775.41** 384674.54**
Lags
1,2,4
1,2,4
1,2,4
1,2,4
Notes:
1. Dependent variable is the individual current period forecast of rGNP
2. Coefficient estimates reflect average across sample across time using random effects regression
3. Z-statistics (under coefficient estimates): * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%
4. Lagged values of the dependent variable included to correct for serial correlation (Reported in last row)
5. Italicized = unexpected, Bold = unexpected and significant
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Table X: Hausman Test Results
Hausman Test Results
Actual Difference in Coefficient Estimates Between FE and RE
Baseline Specification (4)
Full Specification (5)
Veterans rGNP
Lagged Individual Forecast
Lagged Consensus Forecast
Recent Individual Squared Error
Recent Consensus Squared Error
Recent Individual Squared Error X Lagged Consensus
Recent Consensus Squared Error X Lagged Consensus
Number of Observations
Chi Squared (Hausman)
Entire Sample rGNP
Lagged Individual Forecast
Lagged Consensus Forecast
Recent Individual Squared Error
Recent Consensus Squared Error
Recent Individual Squared Error X Lagged Consensus
Recent Consensus Squared Error X Lagged Consensus
Number of Observations
Chi Squared (Hausman)
Veterans Unemployment
Lagged Individual Forecast
Lagged Consensus Forecast
Recent Individual Squared Error
Recent Consensus Squared Error
Recent Individual Squared Error X Lagged Consensus
Recent Consensus Squared Error X Lagged Consensus
Number of Observations
Chi Squared (Hausman)
Entire Sample Unemployment
Lagged Individual Forecast
Lagged Consensus Forecast
Recent Individual Squared Error
Recent Consensus Squared Error
Recent Individual Squared Error X Lagged Consensus
Recent Consensus Squared Error X Lagged Consensus
Number of Observations
Chi Squared (Hausman)
Notes:
1. Chi-Squared: * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%

-0.0121
0.0121

6214
21.72**
-0.0076
0.0070

13788
17.02**
-0.0047
0.0046

5934
6.4*
-0.0098
0.0103

12831
37.62**

-0.0114
0.0110
-0.0197
0.0198
0.008
-0.0082
5988
22.85**
-0.0082
0.0072
0.0031
-0.0024
0.0002
0.0012
13281
36.65**
-0.0049
0.0042
-0.0732
-0.0192
0.0110
0.0000
5934
9.23
-0.0134
0.0146
-0.0798
0.2076
0.0124
-0.0309
12831
69.53**

